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GARY B. CONINE*

The Prudent Operator Standard:
Applications beyond the Oil and Gas
Lease
ABSTRACT
Recent court decisions have determined that the joint operating
agreement used by the petroleum industry contains implied duties
arisingfrom the notion that the operator must perform whatever
actions are reasonable under the circumstances. This article
concludes that the operatingagreement should not be construed
under rules associatedwith relationalcontracts,like the oil andgas
lease, but under traditionalrules of construction that recognize
limitson the implied duties of the operator.It argues that particular
attention must be given to the liability arrangements originally
structured into the transactionby the parties.
INTRODUCTION
The oil and gas lease has been a fundamental document in the
petroleum industry since the 1850s. Despite its brevity, there has been little
change in the essential structure and substance of the instrument during
most of the past century.' In large part, the instrument's durability can be
attributed to the prudent operator standard, a concept constructed by the
courts to evaluate the lessee's performance under the agreement.
Using this standard of conduct, the courts have resolved numerous
disputes between lessor and lessee. Both the lessee's obligations and its
performance of obligations relating to drilling decisions, production
operations, marketing, and government interaction have been judged by
what a prudent operator would have done under the same circumstances.
Results of these judicial decisions have been sufficiently satisfactory that
parties rarely have found it necessary to trouble themselves with drafting
special provisions that would avoid the results obtained under the prudent

0 Attorney; formerly Assoc. Prof., Univ. of Houston Law Center. B.A., Southern
Methodist Univ. (1970); J.D., Univ. of Okla. (1977); LL.ML, Harvard Law School (1988). This
paper was prepared under a research grant provided by the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Section
of the State Bar of Texas.
1. See, e.g., 2 EUGENE KuNrIATREATLSEONIHELAwOFOILANDGAS § 26.1, at 319 (1989)
(noting that there has been the same basic form of habendum clause since 1900). For a
description of the early oil and gas lease, see HAROLDF. WILAMSON& ARNOLDR. DAUM, THE
AlERucAN PErOUM INDUSTRY: THE AGE OF ILLUMINATION 1859-1899, at 92-94 (1959).
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operator standard.2 Generally, the concept has promoted conduct by the
lessee that meets the expectations of the lessor and, at the same time, has
protected the lessee from unreasonable demands by the lessor. Although
claimants may have been disappointed in the results of isolated cases, the
industry as a whole has been willing to accept the guidelines laid down by
the standard.
Given the usefulness of the concept and the acceptance it has
received in the industry, courts have been tempted to rely on the prudent
operator standard in contexts beyond the oil and gas lease. However, courts
should be aware that there are settings in which this approach is
unwarranted and ill advised.3 The prudent operator standard is not an
answer to all oil and gas issues. The standard was designed to govern a
unique relationship within the scope of a specific transaction. Transfer of
the prudent operator standard to other industry contracts can be contrary
to the intent of the parties in some contexts and detrimental to the outcome
of the transaction in others.
This is particularly true for the joint operating agreement. In this
instrument, the parties usually prescribe a standard of conduct for the
operator that requires performance in a "good and workmanlike manner."
This standard, like the prudent operator standard, requires an objective
assessment of the reasonableness of the operator's actions. The similarity
has led some courts to equate the two concepts and to suggest that the
operator must conduct operations under the same standard applied in the
oil and gas lease. By the interpretation of some courts, this means the
operator must not only use due care in performing its duties but also
perform implied duties that would be reasonable under the circumstances,
significantly expanding the obligations imposed on the operator.
The operating agreement is a complex instrument that has been
carefully crafted by the industry to allocate the risks involved in joint
operations among the parties. What is not said in such a detailed instrument
is often as important as what is said. Every provision has intended
consequences that must be honored. No court or commentator should easily
dismiss either the provisions included or the provisions omitted from the

2. "An examination of a number of lease forms and a review of the cases involving
implied covenants indicates that no widespread effort has been made by lessees to modify the
prudent-operator standard by express provision. Only a few reported cases reflect attempts
by lessees to lessen the burden of the prudent-operator standard by express provision by
specifying a lower standard." 5 HowARDP.WILUAMs&CHARLEsJ. MEYERS,OILANDGAs LAW

§ 807 (1999).
3. Cf. 2 BRucE M. KRAME&PAmIcKH. MARmin, THE LAWOFPOOuNG AND UNrTIZATION
§ 19.04[11, at 19-105 (1997).
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instrument.4 Unqualified declarations that the prudent operator concept
defines the operator's duties and performance under the operating
agreement threaten to undermine the structure of the transaction and upset
the careful balance of risks needed for joint operations.
This article will consider performance standards used in the oil and
gas lease and in the operating agreement and will emphasize the necessity
of carefully considering the context in which such standards are applied
before concluding that they impose expanded duties on the lessee or the
operator. Part I will examine the lease as a relational contract, review the
origin and nature of the prudent operator standard as applied to the oil and
gas lease, and note the role the lessee's discretion plays in creating the
broad range of responsibilities imposed on the lessee. It will also discuss the
principal factors that can restrict the scope of these implied terms.
The article will then turn its focus to the joint operating agreement
and the obligations assumed by the operator. Part I will consider whether
the operating agreement is a relational contract in which a performance
requirement as extensive as the prudent operator standard can be applied.
After concluding that it is not, part I of the paper will examine the process
that must be used in constructing implied terms under neoclassical rules of
contract interpretation. In doing so, it will highlight the difficulties in
concluding that specific terms suggested to date can be implied in the
operating agreement. Part IV will look at the combined effects of the good
and workmanlike standard and the exculpatory provisions of the operating
agreement. This final part will attempt to explain the relation between these
apparently contradictory provisions and the important role their relation
plays in the structure of the operating agreement.
The conclusion that must be reached is that there is no basis for
implying terms through the good and workmanlike standard in the
operating agreement in the same way as is done with the prudent operator
standard in the oil and gas lease. The fact that the prudent operator
standard declares that the lessee must take whatever action is reasonable in
managing the mineral interest committed to the lease does not mean that
the operator of joint properties must do the same because it is to act in a
good and workmanlike manner.
Although both concepts establish negligence standards that can
imply a requirement to undertake action that seems reasonable under the
circumstances, other factors must also be considered in an effort to
4. Nevertheless, there are certain operator actions that are governed by a standard of
conduct greater than that expressed in the operating agreement. The operator's mishandling
of funds that do not belong to the joint account and its mismanagement of the sale of a nonoperator's share of production have been correctly held to result in liability under a fiduciary
standard. Such activities arise outside the scope of the operations that are shielded by the
limitations in the operating agreement.
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determine the parties' intent. Implied terms must not be imposed under the
operating agreement beyond the scope of a party's role in the transaction,
outside the duties intended by the parties or necessary to the transaction,
or on the basis of a standard that does not consider the full limitations
prescribed by the parties. Before the court can imply terms in the operating
agreement, it must consider the entire instrument, not the prescription of
a single phrase in isolation from the remainder of the parties'
understanding.
PART I.PRUDENT OPERATOR STANDARD UNDER THE OIL AND
GAS LEASE
A. The Need for Open Terms in the Oil and Gas Lease
The leasing transaction is the foundation of the oil and gas industry.
Countless leases have been used to grant oil companies the exclusive right
to explore and exploit minerals on both private and public lands. It is the
initial transaction that begins a chain of industry activity that runs from
production through transportation, refining, and marketing.
Despite its importance and widespread use, the lease is a short,
concise instrument. Its few, brief provisions accomplish the transfer of
mineral rights, prescribe the duration of the leasehold estate, establish the
royalty obligations that constitute the principal consideration for the grant,
and often supply flexibility to some of the stringent limitations imposed by
the instrument's habendum clause.
But the lease stops short of addressing other critical elements of the
transaction. Although the primary inducement for both parties is the
expectation of production, the lease is usually silent about the actual
operations that the lessee will undertake in an effort to obtain that
production Little, if anything, is said about the number of wells to be
attempted or when, where, and how they will be drilled and operated.'
There are reasons for these omissions. The information needed to
plan and negotiate details on the pace of investment and the nature of
operations is usually unavailable when the lease is executed. Just as the
lessor lacks sufficient data to fix a price for the sale of the mineral estate and
5. See 5 KUN'z,supranote 1,S54.2, at 3-4.
6. The habendum clause, which is the lease provision that prescribes the duration of the
lessee's interest in the premises, is structured with a primary and secondary term to provide
an incentive for the lessee to drill the exploratory wells needed to establish the production
required to keep the lease alive. See 2 KVIZ, supranote 1, S 26.1, at 321-22. However, upon

establishing that production, there are no further devices in the express provisions of the lease

that control the lessee's discretion over further exploration or development, operating
methods, and marketing of production. SeeS WI5
IAS &MEYwi, supra note 2, § 801, at 2.
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elects instead to accept a royalty based on production, the lessee lacks the
information needed to project how operations will unfold. Until geological
and geophysical surveys can be conducted by the lessee, the information
needed to design an exploratory drilling program is unavailable. And until
exploratory drilling has been completed, there is usually no way to know
whether petroleum reserves are present, where they are located, or how
productive they might be. Just as important, the parties have no way of
accurately projecting the cost or revenues associated with operations that
may be conducted years later during the extended, secondary term of a
producing lease. Confronted with these uncertainties, the parties opt for a
leasing contract that does not prescribe the precise operations the lessee will
undertake during the term of the grant.
This arrangement leaves the lessor in a precarious position. The
lessor delivers exclusive control of the mineral estate to a lessee who has
complete discretion over the use of the property. Neither the lessor, nor any
other party authorized by the lessor, can develop the property as long as the
lease is in effect.' As a result, the lessor is fully dependent on the lessee's
initiatives to explore, develop, and produce the property if it is to receive
any substantial consideration for the grant of the lease or see any benefit
from its mineral ownership while the lease is effective.
Contractual arrangements in which such discretion over
performance is given to the performing party are not uncommon. While
there are some discrete contracts dealing with immediate transactions of
limited scope in which the parties' entire understanding is spelled out in the
provisions of the agreement, many contracts fail to address all the
contingencies that may arise in the course of the related transaction, leaving
one party with discretion over performance of unaddressed issues.
Two factors explain why a party may tolerate such omissions in a
contract. First, the party may have overlooked the problem, thereby failing
to realize the necessity of addressing the issue. Second, the party may have
foreseen the problem but decided not to address it." In the latter case, the
party may have elected to consciously ignore the issue either because
negotiations would be time-consuming and costly, or because the issue,

7. See 5 KUNTZ supra note 1, § 54.2; 5WIJAM & MEYMR, supra note 2, § 801.
8.

See 5 KUnZ,supra note 1, § 54.2, at 3-4.

9. See Ian . Macneil, RelationalContract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Ws L REV.
483,487-93.
10. See 2 E.ALLAN FARNSwoRrH, FARNsWORm oN CoNTRAcis § 7.15, at 328 (1998). For
additional reasons, see Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of

Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 278-82 (1992) (adding
ambiguous contract language, the presence of asymmetric information, and an individual
member's desire to be anonymous within a group that is one party to the contract).
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presenting only a remote problem, promised1to be so difficult to resolve that
it could cause a breakdown in negotiations.
These omissions, and the discretion they impart to the party
responsible for conducting operations, result in a contract that does not
conform to the traditional notion of the contingent contract in which the
parties have fully expressed the assignment of rights, duties, and risks
associated with their transaction. The parties' decision to avoid certain
details creates an incomplete contract founded on an expectation that an
unaddressed issue will be dealt with in a spirit of flexibility or cooperation
when and if the matter becomes important. Some contract theorists assert
that most modem contracts are "relational contracts"" rather than
contingent contracts. In truth, each contract lies somewhere along a
spectrum3between the ideal contingent contract and the pure relational
contract.1
By one definition, the relational contract in its ideal form involves
the management of an asset under a transaction where a passive party is
solely dependent on the actions of the performing party due to the inability
of the parties to prescribe well-defined obligations for all contingencies,
subjecting the passive party to opportunistic behavior."' The omission
creates a special situation where a gap in the contract's coverage of issues
important to the transaction results in discretionary control by one party
who is in a position to benefit from opportunistic conduct.'" Requirements
contracts and franchise agreements are but two examples of these
contracts."

11. See Gidon Gottlieb, Relationism: Legal Theoryjfr a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L.REV.
567, 572 (1983). From a law and economics perspective, transaction costs generated by
uncertainty and complexity often prevent parties from accurately allocating all relevant risks
at the time of contracting. See Charles J.
Goetz &Robert E. Scott, The MitigationPrinciple:Toward
a General Theory of ContractualObligation, 69 VA. L Rsv. 967,969-72 (1983).
12- The importance of the parties' relation in contract law was first noted by Karl
Llewellyn. See Karl lewellyn, What PriceContract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704,
712-13 (1931). The more recent development of relational contract theory has been attributed
to Ian Macneil. See Ian R.Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under
Classical,Neoclassicaland RelationalContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L.REv. 854 (1978); Ian R.Macneil,
Values in Contract: Internaland External, 78 Nw. U. L REv. 340 (1983); Macneil, supranote 10.
13. See Charles J.Goetz & Robert . Scott, Principlesof RelationalContracts, 67 VA. L REv.
1089, 1091 (1981).
14. See Charles J.Meyers & Steven M. Crafton, The Covenant of FurtherExploration-Thirty
Years Later, 32 ROCKY MiN. MIN. L INST. § 1.0411] at 1-20 (1986). Although the length of the
contract's term is not necessarily a defining characteristic, relational contracts are usually longterm contracts that depend on the parties'continued cooperation for success. Mark P. Gergen,
The Use of Open Terms in Contract,92 COLuM. L REv. 997,999 (1992).
15. See Meyers & Crafton, supranote 14, at 1-18.
16. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchisingand the Law of Incomplete
Contracts,42 STANFoRD L REv. 927,955 (1990).
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Relational contract theory asserts that the "bargained-for" exchange
at the foundation of any contract occurs in the context of some relation17
between the parties that must be examined to understand the contract.
Gaps in the contract's express coverage of contingencies are filled based
upon norms such as harmonization and cooperation," derived from the
nature of the parties' relationship.19 Relational scholars disagree over the
manner in which these norms should be identified. Some espouse an
external approach that transcends the relationship and relies on a societal
sense of fairness. Others insist on an internal approach that attempts to
satisfy the expectations of the parties." In any event, in a relational contract,
the expectations of the parties, as revealed by the nature of the transaction,
serve as the principal guide to construction when the express terms of the
instrument fail to address all issues that arise in the course of the parties'
relationship.
This relational approach to contract construction is a clear
departure from classical contract theory, which looks to the intent of the
parties as revealed by the explicit text of the agreement.2 Although
relational theory admits that it is constrained by the express terms of a
contract, it is willing to go beyond the confines of the agreement to supply
those obligations needed to fulfill the expectations of the parties.
Where a performing party can abuse its discretion in a relational
contract, protection is often secured through contractual agreements that
provide some inducement for the operating party to properly exercise its
discretion. Commonly referred to as "open terms," these protective devices
usually take one of two forms and may be used separately or jointly.'

17. See Grumman Allied Indus., Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 733-34 (2d Cir.
1984); Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d 671, 679 (2d Cir. 1983).
18. Jay M. Feinman, The Signftance of ContractTheory, 58 U. CiN.L REv. 1283,1301-02
(1990).
19. See Hadfield, supra note 16, at 957. "Iljncomplete contracts often exist deeply
embedded in an ongoing relationship. The parties are not strangers; much of their interaction
takes place 'off the contract,' mediated not by visible terms enforceable by a court, but by a
particular balance of cooperation and coercion, communication and strategy." Id. at 928.
20. See Schwartz, supranote 10, at 275.
21. This position is illustrated in the admonition by one leading contracts scholar that "it
may be said without qualification that if the parties have made a memorial of their
bargain...their actual intent unless expressed in some way in the writing is ineffective...." 3
SAMUL WILLL5TON, WuiSON ON CoINTRAcs §610 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961). See,
E.G., Hunt v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 60 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir, 1932). Today, mainstream
scholars who adhere to neoclassical theory and the law and economics movement assert that
modem contract law does consider the social context of contracts through limited devices, such
as course of dealing, usage of trade, and good faith. See Robert A. Hillman, The Crisisin Modern
Contract Theory, 67 Tx. L. REv. 103,124-26 (1988).
27 See Gergen, supra note 14, at 999.
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One approach relies on a sharing arrangement that allows the
operating party to retain a portion of the profits from the transaction.'
Assuming no conflict of interest between the parties relative to the use of
the assets involved, this approach relies on the self-interest of the operating
party to assure that the property is properly utilized. By granting the
operator an interest in the outcome of the enterprise that is determined by
his actions alone, the sharing arrangement provides an economic incentive
for the operating party to exercise a level of care commensurate with
ownership in the enterprise and make responsible decisions on the use of
the property that are likely to be the same as those the non-operating party
would make.
Alternatively, the contract may provide that the operating party
must perform in a reasonable, non-negligent manner.' Again, the
performing party is induced to use an appropriate level of care and take
reasonable actions to develop the property. The inducement is not the
potential for direct monetary gain promised by a sharing arrangement but
the threat of losses resulting from judicial action if the operating party fails
to act as required. For this inducement to have the desired impact, the nonoperating party must be willing to assume the cost and risk of monitoring,
and successfully litigating, any deficient performance.'
The parties may expressly incorporate either of these devices into
their agreement. But where the contract fails to provide effective protection
for the non-performing party, courts are often asked to find that a
negligence term is an implied provision of the agreement. Except where the
parties have indicated a contrary intention, courts have had little difficulty
in imposing a requirement that the operating party use reasonable care in
exercising its authority under the agreement.
B. Protection under the Prudent Operator Concept
The lessor's posture in the oil and gas lease is similar to that of a
non-performing party in any relational contract.2' Conscious omissions

23. See id. at 1010.
24. See id. at 997.
25. See id. at 1010; Goetz & Scott, supra note 11, at 1093.
26. For application of a relational analysis to an oil and gas lease, see Amoco ProductionCo.
v. Douglas Energy Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 730, 733 (D.C. Ka. 1985). Some courts, particularly
Texas courts, have asserted that the covenants implied in the oil and gas lease are based on a
strict observation of classical rules of construction. See, e.g., HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982
S.W.2d 881, 888-89 (Tex. 1998). Nevertheless, the oil and gas lease closely fits the relational
contract paradigm, and the historical treatment of implied covenants in the instrument is
consistent with interpretive norms that appear to be applied under the theory of relational
contracts. See Gergen, supra note 14, at 997. In recognition of this developing theory, this article
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necessitated by the difficulty and expense of formulating specific operating
plans result in the lessee being given full control and discretion over the
development of the mineral estate in a setting where the lessee can profit
from speculative activity unconnected with the production of oil or gas on
which the lessor depends for its royalty payments.
To protect the oil and gas lessor from the discretionary authority of
the lessee, courts have elected to imply a reasonableness requirement that
takes the form of the prudent operator standard. ' Reliance on the sharing
arrangement incorporated in the lease, though considered and even
accepted in some early decisions,' has generally been rejected.
The first case to fully formulate the prudent operator standard was
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Company.' Although a single gas well had been
drilled on the lease and was holding the lease beyond its primary term
through production, no further drilling had been attempted and the lessor
sought to have the lease cancelled. There were no provisions in the lease
that imposed additional obligations on the lessee after it drilled an initial
well during the primary term. Moreover, there were no provisions
prescribing a standard of conduct for the lessee in its exercise of the
development rights in the leasehold estate.
In this setting, the lessee urged the court to rely upon the sharing
arrangement contained in the lease. The lessor, on the other hand, urged the
court to find that the lease contained an implied negligence term requiring
the lessee to undertake and conduct whatever operations were reasonable
under the circumstances.
The Brewstercourt rejected the suggestion that the necessary degree
of diligence should be determined subjectively by either party individually,
even on a good faith basis. This was based on the recognition that a sharing
arrangement could be relied upon only when both the benefits and burdens
of operations are evenly shared. Although the lease allows both the lessor

assumes that the oil and gas lease is a relational contract and that the prudent operator
standard is an open term used by the courts to deal with the lessee's extraordinary discretion
over operations.
27. See Trust Company of Chicago v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir.
1951); Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33,38 (N.D. 1984); Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d
369,372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Michigan National Bank,
324 N.W.2d 541,545 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 320 P.2d 1039,1046
(Kan. 1958); Stamper v. Jones, Shelburne & Farmer, Inc., 364 P.2d 972,978 (Kan. 1961); Baker
v. Collins, 194 N.E.2d 353,355 (I1. 1963); Salyer v. California Co., 164 F. Supp. 287, 290 (E.D.
La. 1958), aftd, 262 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1959); Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 100 F.2d 945,950 (10th
Cir. 1939); Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 112 So.2d 695,699 (La. 1959); Amoco Production Co.

v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563,567-68 (Tex. 1981).
28. See J.M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Oliver, 79 S.W. 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Van Every
v. Peterson, 24 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1928); Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S.W.2d 834 (Ark. 1952).
29. 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
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and lessee to hold a fractional interest in production, the quality of these
two interests in the shared estate is not identical. The lessee's working
interest is a cost-bearing interest, while the lessor's royalty is a cost-free
interest. The absence of proportional burdens creates an inherent conflict of
interest that prevents either party from being able to rely on the motive of
the other to maximize the benefits of both.
From the lessor's perspective, any effort that produces or preserves
revenues, however small the benefit, is a worthy undertaking. For the
lessee, the decision must involve a balancing of both benefits and costs." No
operation is to be undertaken that cannot be expected to generate a profit.3 1
Likewise, the risk that the lessee will use its control over the timing of
operations to speculate with the leasehold interest to the detriment of the
lessor makes the lessee a poor arbiter of the pace and nature of operations.'
As a result, the parties will not judge any operation by the same criteria, as
they would if each shared a proportionate part of costs and revenues.
Instead, the lessor and lessee will often disagree on the merits of investment
decisions.
Instead of relying on an inadequate sharing arrangement, the court
prescribed a negligence term that required the lessee to do whatever would
be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence under the
circumstances, having regard for the interests of both lessor and lessee.'
The court reasoned that, by necessary implication, the lessee must continue
the work of exploration, development, and production with reasonable
diligence for the common benefit of the parties or the lease should be
terminated.' This implied obligation was grounded in the controlling
intention of the parties, revealed by the various terms of the lease itself, to
obtain productior for the mutual advantage of both parties.'
This "prudent operator standard" establishes an objective test
similar to the reasonable person concept found in tort law.' Whether the
lessee has acted properly with respect to operations on a lease must be

30. See id. at 814.
31. As a consequence, a fiduciary standard that promotes the lessor's interest above the
lessee's has been rejected. See generally 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 806.1. See, e.g.,
Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101,108 (Tex. App. 1992).
32. Thus, the courts have rejected a good faith standard that would give deference to the
knowledge and judgment of the lessee. See 5 WILUAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 806.2.
33. See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
34. See id. at 810. See also Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d 358,360 (Colo. 1991); Mountain States
Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964, 967 (Colo. 1942).
35. See Brewster, 140 F. at 810-11. For other decisions reaching the same conclusion, see
Berry Energy Consultants and Managers, Inc. v. Bennett, 331 S.E.2d 823, 826 (W. Va. 1985);
Mountain States Oil Corp. v,Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964,967 (Colo. 1942); Sohio Petroleum Co. v.
Miller, 112 So. 2d 695,699 (La. 1959).

36. See 5 WnUAMS & MEYERS, supranote 2, § 806.3.
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measured bywhat a hypothetical operator of ordinary prudence would do37
under the facts and circumstances presented by the case.' a This standard of
performance is higher than that imposed on an ordinary individual. The
prudent operator standard requires that the lessee utilize the special
knowledge and skills expected in the industry. Moreover, the standard
ignores the circumstances and difficulties that are unique to the lessee and
demands that the performance be evaluated in the context of the oil and gas
lease in issue. It is irrelevant that the lessee is in financial trouble and cannot
afford to drill additional wells or that the lessee has more attractive
investment opportunities in its portfolio of leases.' If a reasonably prudent
operator would have performed differently, the lessee has breached its
obligations to the lessor.
C. Scope and Dimensions of the Prudent Operator Standard
The result in the Brewster decision has been adopted by most
jurisdictions and the prudent operator standard has become a basic concept
inoil and gas law. Courts have continued to develop the concept, applying
it in a variety of disputes concerning the lessee's performance obligations
under the lease. Along the way, the lessee's duties under the prudent
operator standard have proven to be extensive and often complex.
Commentators and jurists have grouped these obligations into
several implied covenants. Depending on the jurisdiction or commentator,
between three and six implied covenants have been identified. In the most
extensive list,"1 these categories include implied covenants

37. See id. The lessee is entitled to use its own judgment only when the practice of skilled
and diligent operators varies. See MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAW RLATING TO COVENAN'i
IMuw IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 76, at 192 (2d ed. 1940).
38. There is no formula for determining compliance in all cases. A number of quantitative
and non-quantitative factors may be involved in determining a reasonable course of conduct
The Brewster court acknowledged that various factors might be considered in determining
what was reasonable, such as the quantity of oil or gas that can be produced, the local market
for the production, the results of nearby operations, the nature of the reservoir, and business
practices. See Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
39. See 5 WniUAm & MrmS, supra note 2, at § 806.3, (citing Johnson v. Hamill, 392
N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1986)).

40. For an analysis of states adopting the prudent operator standard, see 5 Williams &
Meyers supra note 2, § 8063.
41. See5 KUN"Zsupranote1,§ 55.1. Similarcategorieshavebeensuggested by others. See
MERRILL, supra note 37, § 4; EARL BROWN, THE LAW OF OL AND GAS LEASES § 16.02 (1958); 5
WILLAMS & MEYERs, supra note 2, at § 804. Texas courts have indicated that there are three

recognized categories: (1) the implied covenant of reasonable development; (2) the implied
covenant to protect the lease; and (3) the implied covenant to manage and administer the lease.
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563,567 (rex. 1981).
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(1) to drill an exploratory well,
(2) to protect against drainage,"
(3) to conduct additional drilling after paying production is
obtained,"
(4) to further explore,0s
(5) to market production, and
(6) for diligent and prudent operation of wells."
For convenience, the categories in these lists generally have been
constructed along functional lines. With the exception of the last covenant
of diligent and prudent operation, which has general application to all
leasehold activities, each category deals with a different stage or aspect of
operations.
This functional classification obscures the fact that the prudent
operator standard works in two dimensions." Both dimensions are created
and governed by the negligence test that is at the core of the prudent
operator standard. But the dimensions create distinct types of duties that
must be separated in order to fully appreciate the requirements imposed on
the lessee.
One dimension concerns the lessee's manner of performance and
the care, skill, and diligence with which operations and activities must be
42. See, e.g., Consumes Gas Trust Co. v. Littler, 70 N.E. 363,365-66 (Ind. 1904).
43. See, e.g., Chapman v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 297 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. App. 1956);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563,567 (Tex. 1981).
44. See, e.g., Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27,28-29 (rex. 1929); Cowden
v. Gen. Crude Oil Co., 217 S.W.2d 109,114 (rex. App. 1948).
45. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Scoggins, 329 S.W.2d 424,425 (Ark. 1959); Sohio Petroleum
Co. v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 695,699 (La. 1959). SeegenerallyLake v. Ohio PuelGas Co., 207N.E.2d
659,662-63 (Ohio Ct App. 1965); Gmette v. PepperTank Co., 694 P.2d 369,372 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984). Some courts have declined to recognize this implied covenant, at least as an independent
category. See Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441,449 (Okla. 1981); Sun Exploration
& Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202,205 (rex. 1989).
46. See. e.g., Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576,584-85 (rex. Comm'n App. 1934,
opinion adopted); Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Corp., 6 So. 2d 720 (La. 1942); Chenoweth v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1963); Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485, 492
(5th Cir. 1984).
47. These functional classifications do more than identify the lessee's responsibilities
during succeeding stages of operations. They force recognition that factors affecting the
prudent operator's actions vary during different types of operations. For example, facts that
would compel the prudent operator to drill a well to protect the lease from being drained by
neighboring operations do not necessarily induce that operator to drill additional development
wells to increase the rate of production. See WIIAmS & Msns, supra note 2, § 822.1. Each
implied covenant is distinguished by a unique set of elements that determine whether the
lessee should have taken action on a certain matter.
48. See Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 59 S.W.2d 534, 536-38 (Ky. 1933); Vonfeldt v.
Hanes, 414 P.2d 7, 10 (Kan. 1966).
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conducted. This aspect of the standard dictates the way in which the lessee
carries out the various activities that fall within its responsibilities under the
lease.49 It requires that the lessee use a reasonable level of care that will
avoid losses that otherwise might be incurred.' While this dimension is the
essence of the prudent operator standard, it is most apparent in the
application of the implied covenant of prudent and diligent operation.51
The second dimension identifies the operations and activities that
must be undertaken by the lessee. It does not consider how the operation
must be conducted but whether the prudent operator would pursue it at all.
It requires that the lessee initiate operations, activities, and transactions that
will best utilize leasehold assets for the benefit of both the lessor and lessee.
This facet of the prudent operator standard focuses on generating revenues,
as opposed to avoiding losses.
This second dimension of the prudent operator standard is best
illustrated in the implied covenants pertaining to drilling operations. Before
the lessee must commit its resources to drilling a development or protection
well, the operation must be one that would be undertaken by a prudent
operator. As in Brewster, the primary test is whether the proposed well is
likely to produce enough oil or gas to provide a reasonable profit to the
lessee. Regardless of other factors that bear on the issue, if the well were not
expected to be profitable, no prudent investor would make the decision to
commit its resources to the effort.5

49. See, e.g., Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485 (Sth Cir. 1964) (operating well as
fire hazard); Biskamp v. General Crude Oil Co., 452 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App. 1970) (inadequate
rate of production); Sinclair Oil &Gas Co. v. Bryan, 291 S.W. 692,693 (Tex. App. 1927) (manner
of reworking); Gallaspy v. Warner, 324 P.2d 848 (Okla. 1958) (improper consideration to data
for add treatment).
50. "[The lessee's default] may consist of any negligent or otherwise improper
management of the work of completion which destroys what otherwise would be aproductive
well or reduces its yield." MEURRILL supranote 37, § 76, at 191. "In other words, waste of gas
and harm to the well and sands through the failure to shut off water constitute a breach of the
covenant of skillful operation In the same manner, the lessee is liable for damage of any sort
done to the wells by his mishandling... .The loss of oil through storage in defective or improper
tanks dearly is a breach of the duty of efficient operation for which the lessee must respond."
Id. §81, at 204-05.
51. "The duty of diligent and proper operation imposed on the lessee relates not only to
what must be done by the lessee in serving the interests of both parties, it also relates to the
manner in which all operations must be conducted." 5 KuNTZ, supranote 1,8 59.1, at 106.
52. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959). The profitability requirement
is not limited to drilling decisions. It can also be found in certain aspects of the implied
covenant of prudent and diligent operation. The latter covenant affects both dimensions of the
prudent operator standard. Although it governs the manner of performance of all operations,
it also is used to establish the lessee's obligations to undertake operations in addition to
drilling. For example, the lessee may be faced with a question of whether to shoot a well to
increase production, see Ohio Oil co. v. Reichert, 175 N.E. 790 (111. 1931); Trimble v. Hope
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The list of implied covenants reveals the broad scope of the lessee's
potential obligations under the lease. When these obligations are found to
exist, they are based on the second dimension of the prudent operator
standard. It must be noted, however, that the breadth of these possible
duties does not arise from the prudent operator standard itself. The breadth
of potential duties arises from, and is commensurate with, the extensive
powers delegated to the lessee's discretion under the lease. Beginning with
the grant of the instrument, the lessee alone has authority to determine if,
when, and how the mineral estate is to be enjoyed. It is the only party that
can implement or terminate operations. No other person can dictate the
way in which operations are conducted, provided the operations do not
interfere inappropriately with the rights of neighboring mineral owners. In
essence, the lessee has full and complete authority over the use of the
mineral estate. The prudent operator standard was devised to control this
broad range of discretionary action created by the substantial omissions in
the terms of the oil and gas lease.
D. Exceptions to the Rule-Sharing Arrangements and Express
Obligations
Despite the widespread acceptance of the prudent operator
standard and the implied covenants it creates under the lease, there are
circumstances in which the standard has been set aside in favor of other
stipulations and guidelines. One exception harkens back to the lessee's
original argument in Brewsterthat a sharing arrangement can be relied upon
to assure that the lessee's good faith action will protect both parties. The
other exception recognizes that an express provision addressing a
contingency removes the need for an implied obligation covering the same
issue.

Natural Gas Co., 187 S.E. 331 (W. Va. 1936), toreconditiona well that has declining production,
see United Central Oil Corp. v. Helm, 11 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1926), to install a gasoline plant to
extract liquids, see Guth v. Texas Co., 163 F.2d 893,894 (7th Cir. 1947), or to initiate secondary
recovery operations to stimulate production, see In re Shailer's Estate, 266 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1954)
(if practical and presumably profitable). Because the requirement to conduct these operations
involves a business decision by the lessee to commit resources for the purpose of enhancing
the profit to be derived from the lease, the prudent operator standard recognizes that there
must be a reasonable expectation that a profit will be obtained from the investment "[Slince
shooting [a well] is a risky process,...the lessor [sic] is not required to shoot a well unless there
is substantial evidence of probable advantage to result from the proceeding." MERRILL, supra
note 37, § 77, at 193. "[The lessee] need not make large expenditures [for reconditioning a well]
where there is no probability of success, nor is he under an obligation to attempt to produce
from an upper sand when the lower sand fails, in the absence of a reasonable probability of a
profitable yield...." Id. § 83, at 207.
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In adhering to Brewster and the prudent operator standard, courts
have insisted that the lessee's duties must be determined on an objective
basis, using the actions that a hypothetical, prudent operator would follow
as the guide for what should be expected of the lessee. To the Brewstercourt,
this was essential because the interests of the lessor and lessee were in
conflict as long as the lessee was to bear a disproportionate share of risks
and costs. For this reason, the transaction could not rely on the good faith
judgment of the lessee to determine how the property should be operated.
More recently, commentators and jurists have found that there are
settings where the interests shared by the parties do coincide sufficiently to
permit reliance on the good faith judgment of the lessee. This has been
particularly noticeable in cases involving the implied covenant to market.
In many states, once the lessee has fulfilled its obligation to obtain
production, the lessor and lessee share all post-production costs in
proportion to their interests in production.' In this case, sale of the oil or
gas benefits both parties in direct proportion to their interests. With the
removal of the disproportionate cost burden that troubled the Brewster
court, the sharing arrangement Validly suggests that the decisions made by
the lessee in good faith can be relied upon to adequately protect both
parties to the lease.' Although the sharing arrangement is simply another
way of effectuating a relational contract, it functions much differently than
a negligence standard, imposing neither additional duties nor additional
liabilities on the performing party.
The second exception to the prudent operator standard arises when
the lease contains express provisions that address issues normally left to the
implied covenants. If the lessor and lessee desire to modify the effects of
their relationship by either increasing or reducing the lessee's obligations,
53. The point at which this obligation is completed willvary depending on the jurisdiction
where the lease is located. In some states, such as Texas, the lessee's production obligation is
fulfilled when the oil or gas is severed from the ground at the mouth of the well. All expenses
beyond that point, such as compression, dehydration, processing, and transportation, are borne
proportionately by both the lessor and lessee. See, e.g., Heritage Res., Inc. v. Nationsbank, 939
S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. 1996). Other states, such as Kansas, have taken the position that the
lessee's production obligations are not complete until there is a marketable product. As a
result, the costs of some activities, such as compression and dehydration, must still be borne
by the lessee alone. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
54. "'hegreatest possible leeway should be indulged the lessee in his decisions about
marketing gas, assuming no conflict of interest between lessor and lessee. Ordinarily, the
interests of the lessor and lessee will coincide; the lessee will have everything to gain and
nothing to lose by selling the product. Where the interests of the two diverge and the lessee
lacks incentive to market gas, closer supervision of his business judgment will be necessary."
5 WILUAMS & MEYES,supra note 2, § 856.3. See also Robbins v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 785 P.2d
1010, 1015 (Kan. 1990); Gazin v. Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962).
For criticism of this position, see Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law
under FederalEnergy PriceRegulation, 34 VANDERBILT L REV. 1473,1515-19 (1981).
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they have the right to do so.' In interpreting the effect of these express
provisions, the problem for the courts is determining whether they are
intended to completely supersede an implied duty or simply modify its
requirements under the prudent operator standard, leaving unaffected
aspects of the implied covenants intact. Although some courts have stated
that there can be no implied covenant concerning a matter that is the subject
of an express provision,5' the more widely accepted position is that the
implied covenant is superseded only to the extent it is inconsistent with the
express provision."'
The express provision may be so broad as to affect several implied
covenants. For example, if the lease provides that drilling is entirely
optional for the lessee, no duty to drill will be implied.' However, most
provisions dealing expressly with operational issues are limited by their
terms to a single implied covenant. These provisions will only affect issues
dearly within their scope. Thus, a lease provision declaring that the lessee
shall have no duty to develop the lease or that development is at the lessee's
option will eliminate any implied duty of further development." However,
such a development provision will not be construed as affecting or
displacing other implied covenants6 Similarly, a provision in an entirety
clause of a community lease stating that the lessee will not be required to
protect against internal drainage would not negate the lessee's obligation
to protect against external drainage."
A more difficult question is posed when an express provision does
not fully negate an implied covenant but creates restrictions or prescribes
certain conduct for activities normally covered by the covenant. In such a

55. See 5 KUNIZ, supranote 1,§ 55.2, at 19.
56. See Gulf Production Co. v. Kishi, 103 S.W.2d 965, 968 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937,
opinion adopted).
57. See 5 KUNrZ supra note 1, § 55.2, at 20 (citing as an example Hartman Ranch Co. v.
Associated Oil Co. 73 P.2d 1163,1166 (Cal. 1937)). See also Brimmer v. Union Oil, 81 F.2d 437,
440 (10th Cir. 1936) ("An express covenant upon a given subject...excludes the possibility of
an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature.").
58. See Skinner v. Ajax Portland Cement Co., 197 P. 875, 876 (Kan. 1921); Warren v.
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 211 S.W.2d 314,317 (rex. App. 1948).
59. See RICHARDW. HMOJJGWAY, TIH LAWOFOILANDGAS § 8.4, at 464-65 (3d ed. 1991).
See, e.g., Oliver v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 732 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987);
Hartman Ranch Co., 73 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1937); Davis v. Mose, 239 P. 447 (Okla. 1925); Coats v.
Brown, 301 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. App. 1957). Similarly, a provision that the lessee has no duty to
drill offset wells will eliminate the implied duty to protect against drainage. See Shell Oil Co.
v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App. 1966). See also Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 207 N.E.2d
659 (Ohio 1965).
60. See Hartman Ranch Co. 73 P.2d at 1167; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.v. Christian, 83
S.W.2d 408,409 (rex. App. 1935); Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485,489 (5th Cir. 1964);
Texas Co. v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872, 875 (rex. Comm'n App. 1928, opinion adopted).
61. See Geary v. Adams Oil & Gas Co., 31 F. Supp. 830,847 (E.D. Ill.
1940).
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case, it is necessary to determine how the parties intended to modify the
usual implied duties of the lessee. For example, the lease may contain a
drilling program for the lessee that prescribes the number of wells that must
be drilled and the pace for drilling those wells. Under this provision, the
parties may intend the drilling program to prescribe either a maximum or
minimum obligation for the lessee. In the former case, the provision is
inconsistent with any additional implied development obligation and will
be interpreted to fully supersede the implied covenant.a In the case of a
minimum requirement that does not fully state the lessee's obligation, it will
not eliminate the implied duty to develop whenever it is reasonable to do
so but will establish the minimal requirements that exist regardless of the
reasonableness of the drilling required by the clause.'
This limited approach to the effect of express provisions is
consistent with the treatment of the lease as a relational contract. Under
classic contract theory, the fact that the parties have identified and
addressed an issue suggests that the parties have said all that needs to be
said about the issue. The risks associated with unstated contingencies are
left to be borne by the party inflicted with the loss. In a relational contract,
however, an overarching norm is used to control discretionary actions on
the theory that the parties recognized but did not fully address all
contingencies. In this setting, the express provisions must be applied more
carefully to avoid slipping into the context of the discrete, contingent
contract. Nevertheless, whether the contract is contingent or relational,
courts are compelled to consider the effect of the parties' intent as reflected
in the express provisions of their agreement.
In summary, the oil and gas lease is a good example of a relational
contract. The deliberately unaddressed issues in the transaction leave the
lessee with extensive discretion that invites opportunistic behavior. The risk
of this behavior is reduced by the use of the prudent operator standard as
an open term that supplies additional duties and a standard of performance
that assure reasonable conduct by the lessee. Yet even the prudent operator
standard can be overridden by a sharing arrangement when it provides
effective alternative protection and by express provisions narrowly
construed to assure proper application in the context of a relational
contract.

62. See Beckerv. Submarine OilCo., 204 P.245 (Cal. 1921);Endicottv. DeBarbieri, 369 P.2d
241 (Kan. 1%2); Gulf Production Co. v. Kish 103 S.W.2d 965 (Tex. 1937).
63. See Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959); Alford v. Dennis,
170 P. 1005 (Kan. 1918); Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576 (rex. Comnt'n App. 1934,
opinion adopted).
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PART II. THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AS A RELATIONAL
CONTRACT
A. Nature of the Agreement and Application of the Prudent Operator
Standard
The operating agreement is a contractual arrangement between two
or more parties for the joint development and operation of mineral
properties." The need for the instrument may arise when the development
rights in a tract of land are owned jointly by several parties or when the
development rights in several tracts held by different parties are pooled for
unitized operations through a compulsory order or voluntary agreement.'
In either case, it is necessary for the owners to coordinate their activities
within the tract or unit.
The operating agreement has developed in a deliberate and
progressive fashion in the oil and gas industry. Initially, individual
companies used their own in-house forms as the basis for negotiations in
these transactions." As the use of the instrument became more common,
industry trade organizations began publishing model forms to standardize
the transaction and its more common provisions, thereby simplifying
negotiations and promoting consistency in judicial interpretations of the
agreement. In 1956, after four years of study and drafting by a committee
composed of representatives from twenty-seven oil companies, 7 the
American Association of Petroleum Landmen (AAPL) published its Model
Form 610-1956 Operating Agreement for use on private lands." After
similar efforts, other operating agreement forms were promulgated by the

64. One court has characterized the operating agreement as "lain agreement between or
among interested parties for the operation of a tract or leasehold for oil, gas and other

minerals....Typically the agreement provides for the development of the premises by one of
the parties for the joint account." Akandas, Inc. v. Klippel, 827 P.2d 37,45 (Kan.1992). See also
Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 220 (Wyo. 1994); Archer v. Grynberg, 738 F.
Supp. 449,451 (D.Utah 1990).

65. GaryConine,PrpertyPrviwnsoftheOperatingAgreement-Interpretatin,
Validity, and
Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1263,1268-71 (1988).

66. For examples of these company forms, see 6 WALTER LEE SUMM, THE LAw OF OIL
ANDGAS § 1328 (1987 Supp.), and 2 RAYMOND MEYERs, THE LAWOF POOLiNG AND UNITZATION

§ 15.11 (1986). Operating agreements were being used as early as the 1920s. Seee.g., Potash Oil
& Ref. Co. v. Ohio Oil Co., 199 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1952) (1922 operating agreement); Hughes v.
Samedan Oil Corp., 166 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1948) (1927 operating agreement).
67. The committee used forms from 17 companies to develop the model instrument after
consultation with operating divisions of the participating companies.
68. Thisversionof the AAPLoperating agreement is reproduced in7EUGENEKUN1Z, LAW

OF OIL AND GAs §§ 137.1,137.2 (1979).
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Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association," the American Petroleum
Institute,7 and the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators
revised to adjust for
(AIPN).n Many of these forms have been regularly
n
technical and legal developments in the industry
Under the operating agreement, owners with interests in the
contract area covered by the instrument designate a single party as the
"operator" who will manage operations on the leases that are subject to the
transaction." To this extent, the operator is in a control position much like
the lessee under the oil and gas lease. However, the operator's discretion is
more limited than the lessee's. Unlike the oil and gas lease, the operating
agreement is a lengthy instrument that contains detailed provisions on
various issues affecting the joint operations.' Specific directions are
provided on loss of title, 5 accounting procedures,"" division of production,'
access to information," tax matters," insurancew lawsuits,8 1 transfers and
acquisitions of interests within the contract area,82 surrender of leasehold

69. See RMForml (undivided interests) and Form 2 (divided interests), published in 1953
and 1954, respectively, for use with respect to unproven tracts comprised partially of federal
leases, and RM Form 3 published in 1959 for use on private lands. These forms are reproduced
in 7 HOWARD WILLIAMS & CHARLEs MEYERS, OL AND GAS LAW § 920.3,920.4, &920.5 (1987).
70. The API Model Form of Unit Operating Agreement was prepared by the
Subcommittee on Unit Operations of the API Executive Committee on Drilling and Production
Practice, Division of Production, originally published in 1957 to facilitate secondary recovery
operations in oil and condensate reservoirs. The API Model Form of Unit Operating
Agreement for Statutory Unitization was designed for use in states with compulsory
unitization laws.

71. The ANN published the first Model Form International Operating Agreement for use
in connection with foreign petroleum investment agreements in 1995.
72. For example, the AAPL Form 610 was revised in 1977,1982, and 1989.
73. See, e.g., AAPL Form 610-1982, art. 1.D (on file with author).
74. See Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 220 (Wyo. 1994); Stine v.
Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254,257 (5th Cir. 1992).
75. See, e.g., AAPLForm610-1982, art. IV.A. (titleexamination), art. W.B. (lossof title), art.
VU.E. (rentals, shut-in well payments and minimum royalties) (on file with author).
76. See, e.g., id. at art. VU.B. (liens and payment defaults), art. VII.C. (payments and
accounting), art. IL Exhibit C (accounting procedure).
at art 11.B. (interests of parties in costs and production), art. VI.C. (taking
77. See, e.g., id.
production in kind).
78. See, e.g., id. at art. VLD.
(Internal Revenue Code election).
79. See, e.g. id. at art. VII.F. (taxes), art. IX.
80. See, e.g. id. at art. VII.G.
81. See, e.g., id. at art. X
82. See, e.g., id.
at art. M.D. (subsequently created interests), art. VMI.B (renewal and
extension of leases), art. VMI.C. (acreage and cash contributions), art. VII.D. (maintenance of
uniform interests), art. V1ILE. (waiver of rights to partition), art. VM.F. (preferential rights to

purchase).
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interests,s' and plugging and abandoning wells." The most extensive
provisions deal with the procedures that allow the parties to propose, and
elect whether to participate in, new operations.s
In this context, the operator acts much as an uncompensated"
contractor who agrees to undertake those projects that are authorized under
the terms of the agreement. The operator does not have exclusive control
over the selection and initiation of operations but conducts those operations
that are proposed by any party and approved by those desiring to
participate. Nevertheless, the operator does have exclusive control over the
actual conduct of the approved operations. Consequently, there is a need
to assure that the operator will exercise an appropriate level of care in
pursuing authorized activities. To accomplish this, the operating agreement
requires the operator to conduct these operations in a "good and
workmanlike manner."87
Four courts have recently concluded that the operator in this
transaction is subject to the same prudent operator standard that is applied
to the lessee under the oil and gas lease. These courts reached this
conclusion in two different contexts. One pair of courts has suggested that
the operator must perform as a prudent operator due to statutory
provisions or regulatory orders applicable to compulsory units." The other
pair has reasoned that the good and workmanlike standard expressly stated
in the operating agreement is the functional equivalent of the prudent
operator standard implied in the oil and gas lease. The former decisions are
based on factors arising outside the voluntary operating agreement and are
not relevant to this analysis.5 The latter decisions, though grounded in the
terms of voluntary agreements, are highly suspect.
The first court to suggest that the prudent operator standard
applies under the operating agreement itself was Johnston v. American
Cometra, Inc."' In this case, the operator sold produced gas on behalf of the

83. See, e.g., id. at art. VIILA.
84. See, e.g., id. at art. VLE.
85. See, e.g., id. at art. VLB. (subsequent operations).
86. Although the accounting procedures allow the operator to collect a fee to offset
overhead attributable to the joint operations, the fee is generally not adequate as compensation
for the duties and associated risks that would be assumed by a true contractor.
87. See, e.g., AAPL Form 610-1982, art. V.A. (on file with author).
88. See Parkinv. State Corp. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 991 (Kan. 1984); Samson Resources Co. v.
Corporation Conm'n, 702 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1985) (dictum).
89. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961, 969-70 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
90. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. 1992). The application of the prudent operator standard to
the operating agreement was involved in two intervening cases. However, the appellate court
in one case held that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the operator
had not violated this standard. In the other case, the jury found that the operator had
performed its duties in a reasonable and prudent manner. As a result, neither decision
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non-operators through a long-term contract with a gas purchaser, as
permitted under the operating agreement. In part, the non-operators sued
the operator for breach of contract and gross negligence because it failed to
enforce the take-or-pay provisions of the contract."
The court reversed a summary judgment decision with respect to
liability on the take-or-pay issue, noting that undetermined factual issues
were present in three potential bases for the non-operators' complaint.
According to the court, one possible basis for liability was the operator's
duty under the operating agreement to perform as a reasonably prudent
operator.'
The court's conclusion that the operator was required to comply
with this performance standard had two foundations. First, the court noted
that the operator was expressly required to perform in a "good and
workmanlike manner," a standard that had been previously equated, in the
context of a drilling contract, with "a reasonably prudent person engaged
in drilling oil wells." 93 Second, the court cited one noted authority who has
asserted that the prudent operator standard is normally assumed to govern
the operator's conduct under the operating agreement, as well as the oil and
gas lease."
The most recent case to hold that the operator is subject to the
prudent operator standard was Norman v. Apache Corporation. In that case,
non-operators sued the operator of a gas unit when they discovered that the
sole well on the unit had been shut down six months earlier. Although the
well's production had been marginal for some time, the non-operators
asserted that the operator's failure to provide notice of its action prevented
them from using grace periods in the cessation of production provisions of
the unit leases to drill an additional well that might have preserved the
leases.
The issue in Norman was whether the operator had an obligation to
inform the non-operators of the decision to shut down the well, an
obligation that was not expressly required by the operating agreement."
The court concluded that the operator's duties are not limited to the
affirmative obligations expressly stated in the operating agreement but can

addressed the issue of whether the trial court acted correctly in instructing the jury that the
operator was required to comply with the standard. See Feely v. Davis, 784 P.2d 1066 (Okla.
1989); Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773 (5ft Cir. 2986).
91. See Johnston, 837 S.W.2d at 713.
92. The other two bases were fiduciary duty and agency. See id. at 716.
93. Id. (citing Westbrook v. Watts, 268 S.W.2d 694,697-98 (Tex. App. 1954)).
94. See id. (citing Ernest Smith, DutiesandObligations Owedby an Operator to Non-Operators,
Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 12.03[b], at 12-20 (1986)).
95. 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994).
96. See id. at 1020.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

also arise from the requirement that the operator perform as a reasonably
prudent operator." Citing the decision in Johnston, the court held that the
operator must comply with the prudent operator standard and any implied
duties that might arise under it, with respect to all operations permitted or
required by the agreement." The case was remanded for the district court
to determine whether the operator was liable for failing to perform as a
reasonably prudent operator "under the specific circumstances of the

case.'""
The Johnston decision and, by derivation, the Norman decision held
that the operator's covenant to perform in a good and workmanlike manner
was equivalent to the adoption of the prudent operator standard. The
principal basis for this conclusion was the statement in the earlier Texas
decision in Westbrook v. Watts' that, under a drilling contract, "good and
workmanlike manner" means "the manner in which an ordinary prudent
person engaged in drilling oil wells would have performed the particular
work under the same or similar circumstances."" 1 In the context of a
drilling contract, this definition of "good and workmanlike manner" is
correct.'02 But the Westbrook case did not involve or reference the lessee or
the prudent operator standard that applies in the context of the lease. As a
result, the decisions in Johnston and Norman make a leap in logic that is
neither explained nor justified.
To apply Westbrook, the JohnstonandNorman decisions assume that
a negligence standard in a drilling contract, a lease, or an operating
agreement requires the performing party to act as a prudent operator and
that this requirement defines both the manner of performance and the
duties to be performed. The assumption ignores the differences in each
transaction and fails to properly ascertain the intent of the parties under the
operating agreement before a wholesale adoption of concepts from other
settings. The result is the application of a fairness standard requiring the

97. See id. at 1030. Whether the duty to perform as a reasonably prudent operator
obligated the operator to notify parties of the shut down of the well was a factual issue
remanded to the trial court. The court was to determine whether a prudent operator would
provide notice if faced with the same circumstances.
98. See id. at 1029.
99. Id. at 1030-31.
100. 268 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App. 1954).
101. Id. at 697.
102. The generally accepted definition of performance under this standard is "that quality
of work performed by one who has knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the
successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally considered
proficient by those capable of judging such work." Melody Homes Mig. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d
349,354 (Tex. 1987). See alsoCities Service Oil Co. v. Harvey, 148 F.2d 780,783 (10th Cr. 1945);
Hogan Exploration, Inc. v. Monroe Engineering Assocs., Inc., 430 So.2d 696, 700 (La. App.
1983); Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357,363 n.1 (Tex. App. 1991).
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operator to undertake whatever action seems reasonable under the
circumstances.
This problem is best illustrated in Norman. On remand, the Fifth
Circuit instructed that the fact finder require the operator to do what a
reasonably prudent operator would do under the circumstances. This
instruction was made without restriction other than for limitations possibly
arising from the surrounding circumstances, a factor inherent in any
determination of reasonableness. By ignoring the matter, the court appears
to omit any consideration of restrictions imposed by other terms of the
parties' agreement."3
In applying a fairness standard, the court commits three errors,
each of which is associated with a failure of the court to ascertain the intent
of the parties through appropriate rules of construction. The first error is the
implicit assumption that the operating agreement, like the oil and gas lease,
is a relational contract in which gaps can be filled by societal norms derived
from outside the transaction. While the Norman court does not declare
expressly that the operating agreement is to be treated as a relational
contract, the result of the case is consistent with nothing less than such a
conclusion. This allows the court to avoid the task of applying classical rules
of construction and the necessity of providing legal guidance to the trial
court on the limitations that must be applied to the negligence standard
within the context of the parties' agreement.
The second error lies in the court's failure to consider whether
provisions of the operating agreement set parameters on the negligence
standard selected by the parties. Both the prudent operator standard and
the standard of good and workmanlike performance are based on a
negligence standard." As a result, performance by the operator and the
lessee is evaluated by the actions that would be taken by a reasonable
person engaged in the same trade when confronted with the same
circumstances. In that sense, the two standards are identical.
The court would have been fully justified in equating the two
concepts if it had meant to limit its opinion to that dimension of the prudent
operator standard dealing with the manner of performance required of the
lessee. The decision, however, was addressed to the second dimension of

103. A more conservative reading of the Norman decision would require that any implied
duties be confined within (1) the, limits of operations authorized or permitted under the
operating agreement and (2) the context of conversations among the parties after the execution

of the agreement in which the operator allegedly gave assurances that it would protect the
leases from termination. Unfortunately, the language of the decision allows a broader
interpretation of the court's holding that requires the operator to do what seems reasonable.

This latter interpretation was the basis on which the case was presented to the jury on remand.
104.

With respect to the good and workmanlike standard in the operating agreement, see

Lancasterv. Petroleum Corp. of Delaware, 491 So.2d 768,776 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
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the prudent operator standard and the implied duties under the operating
agreement. This suggests broad managerial duties for the operator similar
to those in the oil and gas lease without asking whether they are within the
scope of the transaction embodied in the operating agreement.
While both the good and workmanlike standard and the prudent
operator standard require reasonable conduct by the performing party, they
do not necessarily impose the same specific duties in every contract. The
duties of the parties must be considered independently with respect to
every type of transaction. It is one thing to say that all oil and gas leases that
follow a standard format contain certain implied obligations that must be
performed by all lessees. It is quite another to say that any party in the
petroleum industry agreeing to perform its responsibilities in a reasonable
manner must assume all additional duties that will promote the interests of
both parties.
This does not mean that implied duties cannot arise under the good
and workmanlike standard." It does mean that proper construction of the
entire contract is required before an implied obligation can be declared to
exist. This is as true for the operating agreement as it is for any other
contract. In the absence of ambiguity, implied duties in any contract are a
legal matter to be determined by a proper construction of the entire
instrument. This is fundamental under the rules of construction for classical
contingent contracts. But even under relational contract theories, gap filling
begins with a consideration of what the parties have expressly provided in
their agreement. There is no assurance that implied obligations
accompanying the prudent operator standard in the oil and gas lease can
be applied to every contract where a similar standard of performance is
required.
The third error is similar to the second but deals with the
performance standard actually constructed by the parties rather than with
the limitations of its application. The good and workmanlike standard in
the operating agreement must not be read in isolation. It is part of a more
extensive provision that includes an exculpatory clause that limits the
performance liability of the operator. Read together, these provisions make
it clear that the operator is not liable under a "negligence" standard, but
under a "gross negligence" standard. As a result, the duties for which the
operator can be held liable do not include those reasonably expected under

105. See Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Russell, 78 A. 718 (Vt. 1911), holding that a contract
to construct a house ina good and workmanlike manner in accordance with specifications that

called for the construction of a properly laid cellar wall implied an obligation to lay a
foundation. There are also cases holding that this performance standard may include an
implied duty to inform the owner of defects in subsurface conditions. See Annotation, Duty of
Contractorto Warn Owner of Defects in Subsurface Conditions,73 A.LR.3d 1213 (1977).
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the terms and circumstances of the operating agreement but those that
would be performed by the operator based on its use of business judgment.
A consideration of these three errors in Norman will reveal both the
proper process for implying duties in the operating agreement and the care
that must be used in doing so. Each error will be examined in turn,
beginning with the issue of whether the operating agreement can be treated
as a relational contract.
B. Distinguishing Contingent and Relational Contracts
The Norman decision assumes that the operating agreement, like the
oil and gas lease, is a relational contract requiring the use of a gap filling
device wherever the agreement is silent on an issue relating to the
operator's duties. It is not particularly important whether the court must
imply a reasonableness standard or whether it can rely on the express
incorporation of the standard of good and workmanlike performance. The
result is the same in either event once the contract is identified as relational.
This conclusion allows the court to set aside traditional rules of contract
interpretation for contingent contracts and employ the reasonableness
standard to imply additional duties needed to assure what it considers a fair
result. The issue can therefore be turned over to the fact finder for a
determination of what is reasonable under the circumstances without
further legal guidance on the effects of the overall terms of the agreement.
This assumption in Norman merits further examination. Although
relational contract analysis works well in the context of the oil and gas lease,
it cannot be applied in every agreement that deals with the development of
the mineral estate. If the agreement lacks the indicia of a relational contract,
open terms such as the good and workmanlike standard, whether express
or implied, must not be applied without considering the intent of the parties
gathered from a reading of the entire instrument.
A contingent contract is the traditional agreement encountered in
contract law. In it, the parties expressly provide for all, or nearly all,
contingencies that might arise in the course of the transaction.
Consequently, the performing party's duties are generally well defined and
the non-performing party can rely on the obligations expressed in the
contract to assure fulfillment of its expectations in the transaction.
In this setting, contract interpretation is based on the intention of
the parties as revealed in the terms of the agreement. Where a gap does
exist because the contract does not expressly address a contingency, courts
may imply additional provisions that supply a reasonable resolution of the
controversy. However, the implied obligation must be consistent with the
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contract's express terms' ° and the intent of the parties revealed by those
terms. If not, the court's implied terms may cause the parties' transaction
to be restructured.
The contingent contract may be silent on some issues. But that
silence can be the result of oversight, precluding the parties from reaching
an agreement on the matter, or it can be the result of a conscious decision
to allocate the risk associated with the matter to the non-performing party.
In the latter case, silence does express the parties' intent and there is no
need for an implied term. Consequently, the court must use great care to
determine if a gap in the parties' agreement actually exists when dealing
with a contingent contract.'
Due to this caution, the traditional process of constructing
additional terms to fill these gaps in a contingent contract is tightly
controlled by restrictions designed to assure that the court adheres to the
parties' intended agreement. Terms can be implied in a contract only when
(1) the matter has not been specifically covered by the written
contract, and (2) the obligation is
(a) So patently obvious that there was no need to spell it out
in the agreement, or
(b) Absolutely essential in order to give effect to the purpose
of the contract as a whole.'
Three elements in this interpretative rule are particularly important.
The initial requirement that the matter not be specifically covered by the
contract entails at least two issues. One involves the obvious question of
whether the contract contains a provision that would be contradicted by the
implied term. A second question imbedded in the initial requirement is
whether the express terms of the agreement establish boundaries on the
transaction and the parties' responsibilities that would exclude implied
terms affecting activities outside the parties' expectations. The third element
is that of necessity, whether based on the essential nature or patent
necessity of the matter."° In either case, the implied obligation must be so
important that the purpose of the contract cannot be attained if the risk is
placed on the non-performing party.

See 3 CORBiNONCONTRACTS § 564, at 297 (1960).
107. "[The courts are justly prudent, careful, and cautious in implying rights, obligations,
106.

promises, or covenants, lest they make the contract speak where it was intended to be silent
or make it contrary to what, as may be gathered from all the terms and the tenor of the
contract, was the intention of the parties." 17A Am. JUR.2d Contracts § 379, at 399 (1991).

108. Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632,635 (Tex. 1941). See also Tejas Grain
Makers, Inc. v. Cactus Feeders, Inc. 762 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. 1988).
109. See HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881,889 (Tex. 1998).
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This classical rule assumes that the contingent contract addresses
most issues related to the parties' transaction. There is a presumption that
missing terms have been omitted by choice,11 thereby assigning the risk of
the contingency to the party suffering the loss."' On the other hand, if the
court is strongly convinced that the basic purpose of the contract cannot be
fulfilled without the missing term, the court may treat the issue as though
it has been overlooked or intentionally omitted by the parties and may
supply the missing term.
By contrast, a relational contract lacks exhaustive provisions on the
performing party's duties, leaving that party with considerable discretion
in the conduct of operations. The parties may have omitted operational
issues because they want to reduce transaction costs by simplifying
negotiations or because they desire to defer contentious issues that may
impede reaching a final agreement. In any event, no effort has been made
to allocate the risks associated with the unaddressed issues in the final
agreement. Upon entering the contract, the parties themselves know that
the purpose of the contract depends on the continued cooperation of the
parties. In this context, where the parties have consciously avoided an issue,
the court is justified in concluding that they have not assigned the risk
presented by the deficiency and can look to the norms of the intended
relationship to supply the missing terms.
Before a court knows which approach to use in implying terms, it
must ascertain which type of contract is before it. But determining whether
a specific contract is contingent or relational is not always easy. Most
contracts are neither perfectly contingent nor entirely relational, but lie
somewhere along a continuum between these extremes."' Some will be
relatively discrete; others will be more relational. A significant step in the
interpretation of the contract is the examination of the parties' behavior
along this spectrum to determine what norms should govern the
agreement. The norms to be applied to the contract will be determined by
whether the agreement is more closely associated with one paradigm or the
other.113

110. "ITIhe absence of a particular provision from a contract indicates an intention to
exclude it rather than an intention to include it." 17AAM. JUL2d Contracts§ 379, at 400 (1991).
111. "No implied provision can be inserted to supply an obligation concerning which the

contract is intentionally silent, even though without such a provision the contract would be
unwise or even operate unjustly." 17A AM. JUR.2d Contracts§ 379, at 400 (1991).
112. See Goetz & Scott supra note 13, at 1091.
113. See Feinman supra note 18, at 1301, 1303. Cf. Hadfield, supranote 16, at 930 (courts
should determine the likelihood that the parties relied on relational norms to supply unwritten
commitments); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract:Internaland External, 78 Nw.U.L REV. 340,
365-66 (1983) (the more relational an exchange, the less likely the parties can allocate risks

effectively).
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Like most contracts, the operating agreement cannot be classified
as strictly relational or contingent. Although the operating agreement is a
potentially long-term arrangement in which the operator is given exclusive
control and discretion over certain aspects of operations involving joint
assets, there are various elements in the instrument that distinguish it from
the relational contract. The operator's exclusive authority is limited to the
operation of individual wells approved and prescribed by all participants
in those wells. As a result, the operator has a narrower range of discretion
than the lessee. This discretion is further constrained by detailed provisions
on a wide range of issues and contingencies that have been identified and
thoroughly considered by the parties. Moreover, the structure of the
transaction provides less chance for opportunistic behavior by the operator
through a balanced sharing arrangement that assures reasonable and
diligent action within the operator's scope of responsibility."" All
participants in any well bear costs and benefits equally, placing the operator
in the position where it has as much at stake in any project as the other
parties except in those instances where the operator has a competing
interest in an adjoining unit." s
Before the appropriate approach to construing the operating
agreement can be ascertained, it must be determined where the operating
agreement falls along the continuum between the relational contract and the
contingent contract. This is not a subject that has received much study by
either courts or scholars. However, several factors derived from the
distinctions between relational and contingent contracts do provide
guidance on this question. Among these factors are the sophistication and
expertise of the parties drafting the instrument, the degree of detail the

114. In mostinstances, the operator will be a participating party in each well. In those cases
where the operator elects not to participate in a subsequent well, the participating parties have
the option of designating one of their own members as operator of the welL See, e.g., AAPL
Form 610-1982, art. VI.B.2 (on file with author). In the event the non-participating operator is
allowed to remain in charge of the new operations, the sharing arrangement does not exist.
115. In this setting, courts have been unwilling to find a special relationship between the
operator and non-operator, see McAlpin v. Sanchez, 858 S.W.2d 501, 508 (Tex. App. 1993), or
to hold that there is a duty of mutual cooperation under the operating agreement, see Texstar
North America, Inc. v. Ladd Petroleum Corp., 809 S.W.2d 672, 677-78 (rex. App. 1991). Based
on non-Texas cases, some authors have argued that the operating agreement is a partnership
or joint venture and thereby creates a principal-agent relationship between the parties. See
Howard L Boigon, The Joint OperatingAgreement in a Hostile Environment, 38 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L & TAX'N 5-1, § 5.03, at 5-10, 5-11 (1987); Ernest Smith, Dutiesand Obligations Owed by an
Operatorto Non-Operators,Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST.
12.02 [1lid, at 12-12 (1986). It is not clear that this position is correct. See Gary Conine, Joint
Ventures in Oil and Gas Contracts:Myths and Reality, 47 INST. ONOIL&GASL. &TAX'N8-1 (1996).
If it does exist, the fiduciary duties that govern that relationship would provide more direct
and appropriate guidelines on the resolution of issues that some courts are trying to answer
under the prudent operator standard.
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parties have attempted to provide in the agreement, the degree of difficulty
to be encountered in providing further details, reasons that explain why the
parties would have declined to include the alleged duty in the contract, and
the presence or absence of other mechanisms for protecting the interests of
the parties. Each of these factors provides an indication of whether the
parties were capable of and intended a thorough allocation of risks in their
contract. Together, they suggest that the operating agreement should be
construed more along the lines of traditional contract law applied to
contingent contracts.
Sophistication ofParties
The degree of knowledge and sophistication of the contracting
parties has often been a factor in a court's willingness to treat a written
contract as a complete statement of the parties' agreement."' To the extent
one party lacks expertise and familiarity with a business transaction that
involves complex or technical issues, a court may bejustified in questioning
whether the contract represents a fair and complete consideration of the
interests of both parties. Where one party is in a position to take advantage
of the other by the omission of express provisions dealing with
contingencies known to one but unknown to the other, it is difficult for the
court to conclude that the parties have reached a complete agreement. In
such a case, it may be proper for the court to imply duties that are required
to promote fairness in the pursuit of the purpose of the transaction. On the
other hand, if both parties are knowledgeable and sophisticated industry
participants, it is more likely that the written agreement represents the
parties' intended allocation of risks."" In this case, the court is less justified
in altering the balance reached in the parties' negotiations.
Generally, the parties to the operating agreement are experienced

investors familiar with rights and obligations under the oil and gas lease
and who have an appreciation of the complexities and difficulties involved
in drilling and operating oil and gas wells. In most instances, both the
operator and the non-operators will be oil and gas companies. Individuals
who are not regularly involved in the industry will often make their

116. "[Wihere the two sides are sophisticated, their allocationof risk and potential benefit

is properly treated as supreme to any conflicting understanding we nay have." Grumman
Allied Industries, Inc. v. Rohr Industries, Inc., 748 F.2d 729,734 (2d Cir. 1984).
117. For example, one judicial opinion involving construction of the operating agreement

observed:
Both these parties are sophisticated participants in the business of developing
oil and gas properties. It cannot be presumed that they were incapable of
including an express provision in their agreement to create...a duty had they
intended or desired to do so.
Tenneco Oil Co. v. Bogert, 630 F. Supp. 961, 969 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
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investment through a partnership with a managing partner that has the
requisite experience to interact with the industry on behalf of the investors.
This is a stark contrast from the situation presented by most oil and gas
leases, where the lessee is usually a participant in the industry and the
lessor is normally a landowner with little experience in the petroleum
business.
It should also be recalled that the operating agreement is very likely
to be based on a model form carefully prepared by industry experts after
extended study. The fact that the companies represented by these specialists
could ultimately be involved as either operator or non-operator provides
added assurance that the transaction was considered with a balanced
perspective for the interests and concerns of both.
DetailedNature of the Agreement
An obvious characteristic of the relational contract is an absence of
detail concerning significant aspects of the transaction. This results from the
parties' inability to anticipate important contingencies or their
unwillingness to deal with them for economic or practical reasons. As
previously noted, the oil and gas lease does not contain express provisions
dealing with obvious issues concerning the lessee's obligation to develop
the property because the parties lack the necessary information to formulate
a plan of action before exploratory activities have been conducted. In these
situations, the court is alerted to the fact that the parties are relying heavily
on unexpressed good faith and diligence to promote the interests of both
parties.
However, as a contract becomes more and more detailed, it
becomes increasingly likely that the parties thoroughly considered all
aspects of the transaction and intentionally omitted additional duties for the
performing party as part of an agreed allocation of risks. While this is no
guarantee that the parties did not overlook the missing issue, it does
suggest that the matter should be closely scrutinized to make certain that
the court is not rewriting the contract by adding implied provisions that
shift the risks that have been intentionally allocated by the parties.1 8
The operating agreement's provisions are considerably more
detailed than those in the oil and gas lease. The operating agreement's
provisions cover not only matters outside the operator's scope of
responsibility, such as title loss and the proposal and approval of
operations, but also responsibilities assigned to the operator that are related
to the conduct of operations, such as providing notices, assuring access to

118. "[Trhe more detailed and comprehensive the agreement, the less likely it is that the
court will conclude that the case before it was omitted." 2 FARNSWORmi, supra note 10, § 7.16,
at 521.
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information, obtaining insurance, paying taxes, handling third party
lawsuits, and adhering to accounting procedures. The breadth of the issues
addressed and the specificity of the provisions indicate that the drafting
parties were not hesitant to spend time or resources in a careful
consideration of all issues connected with the transaction.
Easeof ProvidingMissing Details
The fact that the agreement addresses many issues in detail does
not assure that the parties have not overlooked an issue or made a
conscious decision to leave some unresolved. Consequently, where the
contract does not assign responsibility on a certain issue to one party or the
other, it is also useful to consider whether it is the type of issue that is
unforeseeable or a type the parties would be prone to set aside because of
the difficulty or cost of dealing with it effectively. If the issue is clearly
identifiable and easily addressed, it is more likely that the parties
considered the issue but decided to place liability for the matter on the
party suffering the loss.11 On the other hand, if not foreseeable, or if
difficult to handle during negotiations, the court may find that it is dealing
with a case of omission."
It is obvious that the performance issues omitted from the oil and
gas lease are unaddressed because the parties lack the information needed
at the time of negotiating the lease. This provides a clear indication that the
parties never reached any specific understanding on the lessee's
responsibilities for lease development. By. comparison, the question of
whether the operator should give notice to non-operators when it shuts
down a well is easily anticipated and easily addressed. There is no difficulty
in identifying the issue or in negotiating its resolution. Under the
circumstances, its absence suggests that the parties intended not to burden
the operator with that task. As a result, the court should be cautious in
implying that the operator was responsible for providing the notice. This is
particularly true when the parties have expressly addressed the use of
notices in other contexts, as in the operating agreement.
Reasonsfor Omission of Duties
It is also useful to consider whether there might have been valid
reasons why the parties would consider a performance issue and decide not
to allocate that responsibility to the performing party. If there are strong,
practical reasons why the parties might have allocated the risk to the party

119. "If it was foreseeable there should have been provision for it in the contract, the
absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed." Lloyd v.
Murphy, 153 P.2d 47,50 (CaL 1944) (Traynor, J.).
120. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supranote 10, S 7.16 at 522.
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suffering the loss, there is less justification for characterizing the contract as
relational.
The issue of notice in the Norman case provides an example of such
a situation. The non-operators complained that they were prevented from
using the cessation of production clause in the leases to extend their terms
because they were unaware that production in paying quantities had ceased
by virtue of the operator's decision to shut down the well. If non-operators
are truly concerned with assuring effective exercise of their rights under the
cessation of production clause, notice of the shut down of a well is of
limited use. For purposes of the cessation of production clause, the critical
date is the date the well ceases to produce in paying quantities."' This may
or may not be the day the operator shuts down the well.
Whether commercial production ceases due to the operator's action
or during the course of normal operations is important to the parties'
planning and will affect the provisions that the parties use in the operating
agreement to address the problem. If the operator chooses to shut down a
well prematurely before its production becomes non-commercial, the
operator will have caused the well to cease production and threatens the
continuation of the lease if that well was the sole producing well. Under
these circumstances, the operator unquestionably will be liable to the nonoperators, not because it failed to give advance notice of its action but for
its failure to properly operate the well in a non-negligent, or good and
workmanlike, manner. The fact that the non-operators did not have an
opportunity to exercise their rights under the cessation of production clause
of the lease or leases is irrelevant to their ability to recover losses from the
operator.
On the other hand, production will naturally decline in the course
of operations, forcing the operator at some point to shut down the well
because it is no longer profitable. If it is the sole well on the leases, the
operator may be required to cease operations because the leases have
expired for lack of production in paying quantities. In this instance, it is
important to be able to identify the precise date on which production in
paying quantities ceased, for the cessation of production clause of the leases
will be triggered at that time, not on the date the operator was forced to
shut down the well.
The parties to the operating agreement are not likely to require
notice from the operator in the latter scenario. The date on which
production falls below paying quantities is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to determine at the moment it occurs. The calculations
necessary for such a determination must be made over a reasonable

121.

See 4 KutN77, supra note 1, § 473(b).
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accounting period.122 Because a decrease in production may be followed by
a later increase, cessation of commercial production may not be confirmed
for some time.
As a result, no industry party is likely to accept responsibility for
calculating the date of this event at the time it occurs. It is more reasonable
to expect that the parties would leave this calculation (or more precisely the
anticipation of this event) to each individual lessee, particularly when each
has the right at any time to propose new operations in the contract area.
Any party that feels that conditions recommend additional operations
because it is possible that commercial production is threatened may do so
at any time it feels the investment is prudent or necessary.
Imposing a duty on the operator to provide notice of the more
definite event of shut down accomplishes little and may be counter
productive. If the operator shuts down a well before it has actually ceased
commercial production, it may be liable for gross negligence in the
operation of the well whether it provides notice of the shut down or not. As
a result, the operator is more likely to produce the well beyond the time
when commercial production stops. In this case, the non-operator's reliance
on notice of shutdown may be misplaced. The notice is likely to come too
late to effectively use the cessation of production clause. Such a notice
provision may well lull non-operators into a false sense of security by
suggesting that as long as operations are initiated within the grace period
of the cessation of production clause following notice of final shutdown,
their leasehold interests can be preserved. If the operator has been cautious
in avoiding liability for premature shutdown, the notice will be provided
far too late to be of any use.
Presenceof Other ProtectiveMechanisms
Finally, the courts are well advised to consider the presence of other
protective features in the contract before deciding that apparent gaps in its
provisions merit the addition of implied obligations in the broad manner
justified by a relational contract. The ability of the performing party to act
opportunistically plays a crucial role in relational contracts. Much of
relational contract theory attempts to protect the non-performing party
from the ability of the performing party to take advantage of its apparent
discretion."u Where there are other devices that can provide the incentives
necessary to assure fairness in the use of the performing party's remaining
discretion, there is less reason to take action that may rewrite the contract
for the parties.

122. See Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959).
123. Cf.Hadfield, supra note 16, at 957,986-87.
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The most common alternative to the negligence standard and the
implied duties that might be created under it is a sharing arrangement that
assures that the performing party has the same incentive as the nonperforming party to use reasonable care in determining how and when to
take action to use and preserve the common assets of the parties. This is the
concept that, though rejected in Brewster, has been found recently to exist
even in the oil and gas lease in certain settings. It is a concept that is
generally present in the operating agreement except in isolated situations.
Under the operating agreement, all participating parties share
proportionately in the expenses and benefits of the operations. The
operator's interest is generally at risk to the same extent as the nonoperator's interest.12 As a result, the non-operators are rarely exposed to
the full and uncontrolled discretion of the operator like the lessor is to the
lessee. Where operating issues are unaddressed, the non-operators can
generally rely on economic incentives inherent in the operator's ownership
in the contract area to assure proper performance and protection of
common interests.
In light of these five factors, it is evident that the operating
agreement bears little resemblance to a relational contract. Its development
in the industry, its substantive provisions, and the setting in which it is used
indicate that it is a carefully drafted instrument designed to allocate risks in
a unique transaction. In the absence of special circumstances, it must be
considered a thorough and detailed agreement in which risks arising from
unaddressed duties are more likely meant to be shared by all parties to the
instrument. In this setting, the agreement more closely resembles a
traditional, contingent contract.
PART III. IMPLIED DUTIES IN THE CONTINGENT CONTRACT
If the operating agreement is not a relational contract, it must be
construed under traditional rules governing contingent contracts. Terms
still may be implied, but only under strict guidelines that seek to apply the
contract as intended by the parties. Regardless of whether a reasonableness
standard is expressly or impliedly included in the agreement, additional
duties should be imposed only after careful consideration of the existing
provisions in the instrument and the necessity of the new obligations.
As noted previously, three elements in the classical rule on implied
covenants are particularly important to the interpretation of the operating
agreement." First, the implied obligation must respect the limitations that
are evident in the express terms of the agreement. Second, the implied term
124. As to circumstances where the operator is not a participating party, see supra note 114.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 108 to 111.
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must not contradict express provisions stating the parties' intent on the
issue at hand." Third, any implied provision must be necessary to the
transaction." Unless the basic purpose of the transaction will be impaired
without adding the implied duty, the contract must be applied as written.
A. General Limitations on Operator Duties
Before the court considers whether an implied obligation is
necessary to the transaction, it must first determine that the matter is not
addressed by the agreement's existing provisions. If the parties have
expressed their intent on the issue, that intent must control. The court must
be alert to the fact that there are two ways in which an implied term can
contradict the express provisions of the instrument, one general and the
other specific.
In a general sense, any implied term must fit within the parameters
of the transaction itself. A performing party is assigned certain powers and
responsibilities in any contract. The procedures to be used in exercising
these powers may be expressly set forth in the agreement. If not, a gap may
exist that gives the performing party considerable discretion over the
exercise of its powers. But any implied duties are limited by the extent of
the performing party's authority. Implied duties must be confined to those
activities entrusted to the performing party by the contract. Implied duties
pertaining to activities beyond the responsibilities expressly assigned in the
contract conflict with the transaction intended by the parties.
Thus, it is axiomatic that the extent of an obligor's duties is limited
generally by the scope of its powers under the contract. Implied duties,
whether based in fact or in law, are dependent on the fact that a contracting
party has been granted the authority to function in a certain capacity or has
agreed to perform a certain set of tasks. Obligations cannot be implied that
are not related to the functions that the obligor has agreed to perform.
In the oil and gas lease, these functions are extensive. The lessee is
granted complete authority to manage the mineral estate conveyed by the
lessor. All operations from exploration and development to production and
marketing are the responsibility of the lessee and will not occur unless the
lessee exercises the authority delegated to it under the lease. For this reason,
implied covenants are imposed on the lessee through the prudent operator
standard.
The situation posed by the operating agreement is significantly
different. The operator is not granted full and complete authority over the
leasehold interests that are included in the contract area. Its responsibilities

126. See 17A AM.JUL2d Contracts§ 379, at 400 (1991).
127. See id. § 379, at 398.
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are tightly circumscribed by both the limited functions delegated to the
operator and the rights that are retained by each party to the agreement.
Despite the fact that the leasehold interests of the parties are
committed to the contract area and subject to the provisions of the operating
agreement, the operator is not the manager of these properties.1" The
operator is not responsible for the preservation of the parties' interests, nor
does the operator have the sole authority found in the lease to decide when
and if wells are to be drilled or whether they are to be sidetracked,
reworked, deepened, or plugged back.
The operator's primary duty is to direct, conduct and control the
"operations" permitted or required by the agreement. These "operations"
are not specifically defined in the instrument, but they are easily identified
by those activities that are "permitted and required" under the provisions
of the agreement."' By the terms of the agreement, these activities are
restricted to drilling, maintaining, and regulating the production of
individual wells authorized by the parties initially or as subsequent
operations. The operator's control over operations is initiated by the parties
on a well-by-well basis and limited to those wells that are approved by the
parties.1" This control extends through the proper maintenance of each well
so long as it can be profitably operated, but it is limited by the delivery of
production to each participant for individual disposal. 3
In addition, the operator is assigned certain administrative duties
that are supplemental to these "operations." Prior to the commencement of
drilling operations, the operator is required to obtain a title examination for
each drill site or drilling unit connected with an authorized well;" to secure

128. There are instances where the operating agreement may impose a broader duty on the
operator. See, e.g., Easterday v. Marchman, 183 N.E.2d 182,184 (IlL App. Ct.1962) (appointing
operator as non-operators' "attorney to manage, and operate [the] lease."); Great W. Oil & Gas
Co. v. Mitchell, 326 P.2d 794, 798 (Okla. 1958) (giving operator "complete management and
control over the joint property"); Forest Oil Corp. v. Superior Oil Co., 338 So.2d 758, 759 (La.
Ct. App. 1976) (charging the operatorwith managing, developing and operating the property);
Oxy USA, Inc. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 883 P.2d 1216, 1218-19 (Kn. Ct App. 1994)
(giving the operator "full control of the premises" to "conduct and manage the development
and operation of said premises"); Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources Ltd., 40 F.3d
1474,1475 (5th Cir. 1995) (placing operator in charge of "all operations necessary or proper for
the development, operation, protection and maintenance" of the joint property),
129. See AAPL Form 610-1982, art V.A (on file with author). For the terms of this article,
see text accompanying note 163 infra.
130. See id.
at art. VLA. (initial well), & art. .(subsequent operations).
131. See id.
at art VIL C. In most instances, each non-operator will dispose of its share of
production from each well. Where a non-operator fails to do so, the operator has the option to
make sales arrangements for the non-operator. Such activity, if it is accepted by the operator,
would be included among those operations "permitted" by the operating agreement.
132. See id.
at art. I.A.
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competitive bids before executing a drilling contract for each well; to
handle payments from and collections for the joint account in connection
with each well;" and to deal with certain administrative matters that
include procurement of insurance," rendering and payment of ad valorem
taxes," settlement of third party claims and suits," and the sending of
prescribed notices associated with the shut-in of any well"s or the proposal
to plug and abandon a well.1 ' Like the operator's primary duties, these
administrative obligations stem from operations connected with individual
wells.
That the operator's responsibilities are limited to operations
associated with individual wells is further confirmed by the rights retained
by the parties to the instrument. Unlike the lessee, the operator does not
have sole power to determine which wells will be drilled in the contract
area. Any party may propose that a well be drilled and each party has the
right to decide whether it will participate in any well. 1" A non-operator
cannot be harmed by the operator's failure to propose or participate in
drilling operations. Each party retains the ability to protect its own interest.
As a consequence, absent additional facts indicating a different
understanding between the parties, there is no basis for holding that the
operator has a duty to promote the protection or development of the leases
in the contract area on behalf of the non-operators.
This is illustrated in Tenneco Oil Company v. Bogert."' In that case,
the operator, which had been designated by a forced pooling order,
executed an operating agreement with the non-operator that obligated the
operator to drill an initial test well. As usual under the operating
agreement, additional wells could be drilled by either party with or without
the consent and participation of the other. After the test well was
successfully drilled and completed, the operator drilled a producing gas
well on an adjoining unit. The non-operator alleged that the operator knew
that the well on the adjoining unit was draining gas from the contract area
and that the operator had a duty to protect the area from drainage by
drilling an increased density well.'4

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at art. V.D.
See id. at art. VILC.
See id. at art. V[I.G.
See id. at art. VU.F.
See id. at Art. X.
See id. at art. VII. E.
See id. at art. VI.E.2.
See id. at art, VI.B.
630 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
See id. at 963.
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The district court held that the operator had no duty to drill further
wells, even for the protection of the parties' interests. The court rejected
arguments by the plaintiff that the operator was required to take action
because it was obligated to act as a prudent operator,'" as a fiduciary,1" or
on the basis of a good faith requirement." ' It distinguished the duties of the
operator from the duties of the lessee, noting that under the lease the lessor
contracts away its right to develop the leasehold, whereas the non-operator
has as much right to drill an increased density well as the operator.'
Similarly, it is clear that the operator is not responsible for
preserving the interests that are covered by the operating agreement." 7
Special limitations contained in the leases may result in termination of the
leasehold interests if producing wells have not been drilled by certain dates
or if delay rental or shut-in royalty payments are not properly made.
Responsibility for assuring compliance with these requirements to preserve
title to the leases in the contract area is not delegated to the operator.
Instead, each party contributing a lease to the contract area is
responsible for making its own rental, shut-in royalty, and minimum
royalty payments,'" and each party must make its own royalty payments.14 9
In the event a party fails to make one of these payments through mistake or
oversight and the lease consequently terminates, the party incurs no
liability for the loss but will suffer a reduction in its proportionate interest
in the contract area."5' If all or part of a lease is lost because a well required
under the lease has not been drilled, the termination of the lease is treated
as a joint loss of all parties, on the theory that any party could have
proposed and drilled the necessary well if it felt the project was justified.5 1
In Stine v.MarathonOil Company," the plaintiff and defendant were
co-owners of certain leases under a farm-out agreement and had executed
an operating agreement to coordinate their activities on the leases. A
drilling program in the farmout agreement required that wells be drilled on
the leases at prescribed intervals. If not, unproductive acreage would revert
to the farmor.'

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 969-72.
See id. at 966-67.
See id. at 969.
See id. at 971 n.8.
See Smith, supra note 115, at 12.03[7][iv] 12-49.
See AAPL Form 610-1982, art. VII.B (on file with author).
See id. at art. IH.B.
See id. at art. W.B.2.
See id. at art. WV.B.3.
976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 257.
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Disputes arose between the parties over several issues, one of
which involved an alleged surrender of the leases by Marathon and a
resulting failure of Marathon to assign its interest under the farmout to
Stine, as required by the operating agreement." s Stine argued that
Marathon evidenced its intent to surrender unproductive portions of the
leases when Marathon indicated during sales discussions with another
company that it did not intend to drill subsequent wells required by the
drilling program in the farmout"s
The court held that Marathon, as operator, had not breached the
surrender clause of the operating agreement. It noted that Marathon's
indication that it would not drill additional wells was not the equivalent of
an intent to surrender. Moreover, the court emphasized that preservation
of the leases in the contract area was not the sole responsibility of the
operator. Both Marathon and Stine had a duty to preserve the leases by
paying delay rentals and either could save the leases by drilling the
required wells. If the operator had failed to preserve the leases, Stine could
have prevented a surrender by acting on its own authority under the
operating agreement."6
Both Bogert and Stine used proper restraint in refusing to impose
implied duties on the operator. In each case, the non-operator urged the
court to find the operator liable for failure to take action that would have
benefited all parties, even though not expressly required by the operating
agreement. Based on the limit of the operator's exclusive powers, the courts
declined to find that the operator had a duty to act.
In contrast, neither Norman nor Johnston admits any limitation on
the implied duties that might arise under a negligence standard other than
to note that these implied duties must be reasonable under the
circumstances. Without considering whether these duties fall within the
scope of the operator's authority, a matter clearly within the court's
interpretive domain, the decisions in these cases turn the question of
implied duties over to the fact finder.
B. Specific Limitations on Operator Duties

154.

Art. VIII.A. of the operating agreement provided:

The leases covered by this agreement...shall not be surrendered in whole or
in part unless all parties consent thereto. However, should any party desire
to surrender its interest in any lease or any portion thereof, and other parties
do not agree or consent thereto, the party desiring to surrender shall
assign ... all its interest is [sic] such lease or portion thereof.. .to the parties not
desiring to surrender it.
Id. at 265.
155. See id. at 265.
156. See id. at 265.66.
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An implied term can also conflict with the parties' intent if
inconsistent with a specific provision. This is not a problem when the
contract clearly and fully addresses the matter in controversy. In such a
case, the parties' intent is apparent and there is no gap in the contract that
the court is required to fill. But problems can arise when an express term
addresses an issue incompletely. In the latter instance, the court must
consider the purpose and meaning of the express provision to assure that
any implied duty on the issue will not conflict with the parties' original
intent.
Even under the oil and gas lease, courts have been compelled to
consider the effects of express provisions before giving full effect to implied
covenants. Because the lease is a relational contract where the need to
preserve the transaction is paramount, courts have been careful to give
effect to the specific provisions only to the extent that they clearly conflict
with the implied covenants.1 " In dealing with a contingent contract,
however, traditional rules of construction permit the court to examine the
intended effects of a provision more broadly and conclude that any
expression by the parties on an issue assigns all responsibilities and risks
connected with that subject, precluding the court from implying additional
terms in that area.
For example, one decision that has considered the operator's
responsibility to supply data and information to the non-operators has
concluded that the operator has limited duties in this area. In Frankfort Oil
Company v. Snakard,1 neither the operator nor the non-operator had elected
to drill on certain leases that expired at the end of their primary terms for
lack of production. The non-operator asserted, among other things, that the
operator was liable for the value of leases that had expired because the
operator had failed to disclose geologic and geophysical information about
the oil structure on the leases that might have convinced the non-operator
to drill. The court noted that the operating agreement contained no
provisions requiring the operator to supply such information and
emphasized that the agreement expressly gave the non-operator the right
to inspect and audit the operator's books. The latter provision gave the nonoperator the right to acquire information through its own efforts, a right
that was never denied the non-operator. As a result, the court refused to
rewrite the agreement for the parties and imply a duty for the operator to
provide information on its own initiative.
The Snakardcourt gave broad effect to the non-operator's right to
obtain information upon request, holding that this right provided a
satisfactory method for the non-operator to secure information for its

157. See supra text accompanying notes 55 to 63.
158. 279 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1960).
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operational decisions. Because the parties had provided this avenue for the
non-operator to obtain information at its discretion, the court declined to
impose additional obligations on the operator to satisfy the same need.
This result is consistent with the non-operator's reserved right, and
its resulting responsibility, to manage title to its own property and to
participate in proposing and selecting drilling operations. The
considerations that may enter into the decisions associated with these
functions are extensive, and it is unreasonable to expect that the operator
should be responsible for anticipating, collecting and providing all
information that each non-operator might deem important. It is more
logical to allow the operator to focus its efforts on conducting the drilling
and production operations authorized by the parties and permit the nonoperators to determine the information needed by them at any given time
that is not already available through monthly statements by the operator.
One deficiency in the Norman opinion is the failure to consider the
meaning of provisions in the operating agreement that bear on the issue of
the operator's duty to provide information and notices to the non-operator.
Instead, the court began with the conclusion that the good and
workmanlike standard, like the prudent operator standard in the lease,
requires the operator to do whatever is reasonable under the circumstances.
With that decided, the court ignored the effects of any express provisions
that might indicate the parties intent on the issue of notice and cessation of
production.
The Norman court failed to consider that the operating agreement
is careful to expressly provide for notices in instances where they are
appropriate and necessary. Notice requirements are imposed in at least 20
situations in the 1982 version of AAPL Form 610, including the notice that
must be provided when a well is plugged and abandoned. Given the
number of times the parties deemed notice to be important and the ease
with which the requirement could be imposed, it is difficult to imagine that
the parties inadvertently omitted other notices containing information that
affected the leasehold interests. This suggests that the operating agreement
intended to exclude notice requirements that are not expressly required in
the instrument. The non-operator remains protected by the operator's
obligation to provide additional information when requested by the nonoperator.
C. Necessity of the Implied Duty
The third limitation on implied provisions is the requirement of
necessity. The court may construct an implied duty only if it is necessary to
the purpose of the contract. This requirement assures that the court will not
insert a provision where the parties considered the issue but determined
that the transaction could function satisfactorily without placing a duty on
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any party to act on the subject, thereby allocating the risk to the party
suffering the associated loss. On the other hand, if an unaddressed issue
were critical to the parties' transaction, the court is free to imply a
reasonable provision that will preserve the purpose of the contract based on
the assumption that the parties must have overlooked the issue or
consciously chose to omit it from their express agreement without assigning
the risk to either party.
For example, covenants routinely implied in the oil and gas lease
impose operating duties on the lessee that are necessary to fulfilling the
purpose of making the leased property profitable for both parties.1 The
lessor's dependence on royalties paid on produced volumes of oil or gas as
consideration for its grant of the lease makes it essential, from the lessor's
perspective, that the lessee undertake to develop whatever reserves may lie
beneath the tract. While the lessee may be able to profit from speculation
despite its inaction, the lessor profits only when the property is developed.
This suggests that the parties did not intend the lessee to have unfettered
discretion over development but that operating requirements were
consciously avoided, leaving the court free to supply a reasonable norm to
resolve operating disputes, as in the cases following the Brewster decision.
For purposes of the operating agreement, it is not necessary to
require that the operator undertake all reasonable action connected with the
operation and management of the leases in the contract area. The scope of
the transaction and the impracticality of relying on the operator to perform
certain functions suggest that some duties that might have been assigned
to the operator have been omitted by design to place responsibility on each
interest separately. Both Norman and Johnston provide examples of
situations where additional duties implied by the courts would be neither
necessary nor practical.
In Norman, the non-operators asserted that the operator should
have an implied duty to provide notice to all participants when a well was
shut down. The purpose of this alleged duty was to allow the non-operators
an opportunity to reevaluate whether additional operations should be
initiated in an effort to continue the term of the leases comprising the
contract area. While such a notice has a useful purpose, it is not necessary
to the purpose of the operating agreement."W
The operating agreement is intended to facilitate the joint drilling
and operation of wells within a defined area. It makes it possible for parties
to drill with assurance that the costs and production will be shared by all
interested parties. But the transaction does not extend beyond the joint

159. See Gary B.Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics ofOil and Gas Law,
33 WASHBURN L J. 670,678 (1994).
160. Cf. HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 890 (Tex. 1998).
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operation of individual wells. The operator, being authorized to do so by
the parties electing to participate in a well, is obligated to drill and produce
the well in a good and workmanlike manner.
Although notice upon shut down may be useful under some
circumstances, it is not necessary to the operation of authorized wells.
Instead, such notice relates exclusively to lease preservation, a duty that
remains with each individual working-interest owner. As Bogert and Stine
make clear, the operator is not the manager of the leasehold interests nor is
the operator responsible for protecting and preserving the title to the leases
that comprise the contract area. If any party desires to propose additional
operations that will continue to preserve leasehold interests, it has the
power and authority to do so. With this authority goes the responsibility for
looking after its own interests by keeping itself informed of the status of
operations and the level of production being obtained from its properties.
It would be impractical for the operating agreement to place this
responsibility with any one party. As noted previously, 61 the critical date
for lease preservation is the date on which there is a cessation of commercial
production." Once production falls to that level, the lease will
automatically terminate unless the lease contains a savings clause granting
a grace period in which production can be reestablished. Unfortunately, the
determination of the date on which commercial production stops is difficult
and may not be known for some time after the event. To require the
operator to make this precise determination would be unreasonable and
lead many non-operators into a false sense of security over the status of
their properties at times when they should be reevaluating their options or
fulfilling their individual duties as lessee's under the implied covenants of
their leases. In light of the monthly information reported by the operator
and the non-operator's right to request and obtain data from the operator,
there is no reason why a diligent and prudent non-operator could not act
to preserve its leasehold interests.
Much the same situation was presented in Johnston, where the
operator had exercised its right to contract for the sale of the non-operators'
gas production. Rather than diligently looking after their own interests
under these contracts and suing as third party beneficiaries when take-orpay requirements were not satisfied, the non-operators relied on the
operator to monitor and enforce the contract.

161. See supra text accompanying notes 121 and 122.
162. An entirely different question is presented if the operator shuts down a well
prematurely. This directly involves the operator's responsibilities with respect to an individual
well placed in its exclusive control. With or without notice, the operator may be liable for its

decision.
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Was this monitoring and enforcement by the operator necessary to
the purpose of the operating agreement so that the court was justified in
implying such a duty? The court never made this determination, but
remanded the issue of an implied duty under the prudent operator
standard to the lower trial court for consideration. The court could have
clarified the remand instructions by addressing the necessity of such action
to the purpose of the contract.
Although its primary duties are restricted to the drilling and
operation of authorized wells, the operator may extend those duties by
electing to contract for the sale of a non-operator's production. The purpose
of this expansion is to protect against the inability or refusal of a nonoperator to dispose of its share of production, thereby avoiding
complications in balancing production accounts and assuring that
maximum production can be obtained from the properties. This does not
mean that the operator is assuming responsibility for representing the
interests of the non-operators for all purposes under these contracts. Nor is
it necessary that the operator do so if the non-operator can monitor and
enforce the buyer's performance as easily as the operator. It is also
impractical to assume that the operator will always be in a position to detect
non-performance so that enforcement can be initiated in a timely manner.
Before a court can imply duties in a contingent contract, it must
consider both general and specific limitations in the agreement that place
restrictions on the authority of the operating party and the necessity of
additional duties to the transaction. The Johnstonand Norman opinions did
not address these traditional limitations on implied covenants. Although
this task is part of the interpretive authority of the court, neither decision
attempted to review the entire instrument to determine whether there were
limitations imposed on the "good and workmanlike" standard before it was
delivered to the fact finder for application. This is unfortunate because the
holdings threaten to expand the operator's duties beyond those actually
intended by the parties or necessary for the transaction.
PART IV. EFFECT OF THE EXCULPATORY CLAUSE
The Johnstonand Normancourts erred in failing to properly employ
rules of construction and in reaching the conclusion that the operator in
each case might be found subject to certain implied duties. But the greatest
oversight in both cases was the failure to apply the full text of the
performance standard contained in the operating agreement. In each case,
the court emphasized the requirement that the operator conduct operations
in a good and workmanlike manner and concluded that the operator had
agreed to be governed by a negligence standard equivalent to the prudent
operator standard. Depending on what was reasonable under the
circumstances, implied duties could arise and the operator could be held
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liable for breach of those obligations. In taking this position, the courts
ignored the meaning and effect of exculpatory provisions contained in the
same clause that limit the operator's liability to acts of gross negligence.
Regardless of whether additional duties are implied in the
operating agreement, the instrument makes it clear that the operator is not
liable for losses sustained by the non-operators unless the operator has been
grossly negligent in performing its duties. Although this limitation does not
preclude the creation of implied duties, it does indicate that liability for
breach of those duties can arise only under conditions more extreme than
normally associated with breach of contract or ordinary negligence. In fact,
the gross negligence standard and the setting in which it is used suggest
that the operator is entitled to protection similar to that given to corporate
officers and directors under the business judgment rule. This would make
the operator liable to the non-operators only when it has acted in bad faith,
a standard. commonly applied under a sharing arrangement like the one
created in the operating agreement.
The complete text of the provision on operator responsibilities
usually reads as follows:
[The Operator] shall conduct and direct and have full control
of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and
required by and within the limits of this agreement. It shall
conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike
manner, but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except as
may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct."
The full provision consists of three parts. The first gives the
operator full control of all "operations." The second requires the operator
to conduct those operations in a good and workmanlike manner. The third
part is an exculpatory clause that excuses acts of negligence by limiting the
operator's liability for injuries and losses suffered by the non-operators
resulting from anything less than the operator's gross negligence.'"

163. AAPL Form 610-982, art. V.A (onfile withauthor).Someearlyoperating agreements,
including AAPL Form 610-1956, provided that the operator would have no liability except for
gross negligence or "breach of contract." The deletion of any reference to "breach of contract"
in more recent agreements indicates the drafter's intention to create a more restrictive
limitation on liability, which is the subject of this part of the article. It should be noted,
however, that the analysis in this part is restricted to those operating agreements using the
more contemporary wording that deletes liability for "breach of contracL"
164. This includes losses from liabilities to injured third parties, which the operator may
treat as operating expenses to be charged to the joint account and collected proportionately
from each party participating in the project. See Smith, supra note 147, at 12-30. The operator
must still bear its share of the losses based on its proportionate interest in the project
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The language of the exculpatory clause raises a question of whether
the limitation on liability applies to claims for breach of contract, as well as
tort claims. This query is particularly important for purposes of interpreting
and applying the good and workmanlike standard. Most authorities are in
agreement that claims under this standard can be brought in tort or
contract. If the exculpatory clause is to have any effective meaning, the
clause must be applicable in both contexts.
This appears to be the case in some decisions that have addressed
the issue. In Stine v. Marathon Oil Company," the non-operator alleged
several acts of operator misconduct, including breach of contract in failing
to complete wells in a timely fashion, in failing to share information, and in
failing to turn over wells that the operator had decided to abandon.1 "
Additional charges alleged tortious interference with the non-operator's gas
sales contract by wrongfully collecting overcharges from sales proceeds."6
A major issue in the case was whether the operating agreement's
exculpatory clause shielded the operator from liability for any act done
under color of the agreement, regardless of whether the action was based
on tort or breach of contract.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the exculpatory clause protects the
operator from liability for any act authorized by the agreement and
undertaken in its capacity as operator. The court determined that this
protection extends beyond tort liability to include breach of contract.
Consequently, the operator is only liable for a loss caused by a failure to
perform administrative and accounting duties if the breach resulted from
the operator's gross negligence or willful misconduct."

165. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).
166. See id. at 257-58.
167. See id. at 258.
168. See id. at 260-61. Note, however, that the Tenth Circuit refused to apply a similar
exculpatory clause against a counterclaim by a non-operator alleging breach of an express
provision in a unit operating agreement in Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909
(10th Cir. 1993). The unit operator was charged with reducing production after the nonoperators rejected the operator's workover plan to correct high gas-to-oil ratios in some of the
unit wells. A provision in the operating agreement precluded the operator from making any
substantial change in basic operation of the wells without approval of the working interest
owners. The operator argued that the exculpatory clause excused it from liability except in
cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct. See id. at 922. The court disagreed, holding that
the exculpatory clause, which must be strictly construed, did not exempt the operator from
liability for deliberate actions in breach of contractual provisions that shift costs between the
contracting parties. See id. at 923.
The restrictive interpretation of the exculpatory clause in the Amoco Rocmount
decision applies to express provisions in the operating agreement where the parties have
clearly negotiated an allocation of risks and costs. Consequently, the one area in which Stein
and Amoco Rocmount are in agreement is the application of the exculpatory clause to those
"operations" that are the subject of the paragraph containing the exculpatory clause. This
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At first glance, this creates an apparent inconsistency. In a single
sentence, the operating agreement imposes an obligation for the operator
to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner, a recognized
negligence standard with implications arising in tort and contract, and then
excuses all liability unless arising from gross negligence or intentional
malfeasance. The provision seems to give certain assurances to the nonoperator with one hand, only to take them back with the other.
Understandably, the provision has been a source of confusion from time to
time in legal circles.
Nevertheless, the provision can be applied in a way that gives
meaning to both the negligence standard and the gross negligence limit on
liability. The key to understanding the parties' intention in this area lies in
separating those matters where a negligence standard can be applied from
those where the gross negligence standard controls. The exculpatory clause
only limits the operator's liability, thereby partially shielding the operator
from monetary damages. This is important protection but it leaves two
settings in which the operator's failure to perform in a good and
workmanlike manner can still be relied upon as the basis for legal action by
the non-operator.
The first uses breach of the operator's duty as a defense to a
demand for contribution to operating costs. 69 In a sense, the operating
agreement is similar to a construction contract between an owner and an
independent contractor. As a general principle, the independent contractor
is not entitled to payment for its services unless its duties have been
substantially performed. This requirement of substantial performance
includes the fulfillment of the duty to perform in a good and workmanlike
manner. A failure to perform services diligently and in a reasonable manner
allows the owner to refuse payment without an adjustment for the losses
caused by the deficient performance. By requiring the operator to perform
in a good and workmanlike manner in matters unrelated to liability issues,
the operating agreement permits the non-operators to raise deficiencies in
reasonable performance as a defense against having to pay for their share

would include implied duties arising from the covenant to perform those "operations" in a
good and workmanlike manner. Restricting Stein in this fashion allows a more sensible
application of the exculpatory clause. It Is difficult to perceive why the parties would include

explicit and detailed directions on administrative matters that are supplemental to
"operations" if they did not intend the operator to be liable for breach of those matters. This
is particularly true because the performance of those administrative duties does not generally
involve extraordinary risks against which the operator should be protected. Performance of
"operations" and implied duties connected with those operations are another matter. The
operating agreement does not function well if the risks associated with these activities are
borne by the operator alone. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 163 to 168.
169. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316 ('rex. App. 1982).
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of the actual, direct costs of the operation. This provides an incentive for the
operator to use reasonable care in the course of the operations, while
protecting the operator from having to personally absorb the extraordinary
liabilities that can result from accidents during oil and gas operations that
are often risky or hazardous.
The second setting where the good and workmanlike standard is
still useful involves removal of the operator for failure to perform its
duties.' " Whether the operator refuses to abide by the agreement's express
provisions on actions and procedures to be used by the operator or fails to
abide by its covenant to use reasonable care in conducting operations, the
standard provides the foundation for the non-operators to vote for removal.
This supplies added security to the non-operators by permitting them to
substitute another company as operator if they are dissatisfied with the
decisions and methods being used. At the same time, the operator is still
protected from excessive liability through the exculpatory clause.
There are legitimate reasons why parties to the operating
agreement seek to insulate the operator from liability."' The first is a
practical concern about making the operator's job so unattractive that no
working interest owner will assume those responsibilities. While the
operator is similar to a construction contractor who is reimbursed by the
non-operators for their proportionate share of expenses, the operator is not
compensated for acting in that capacity through any payment that
represents a reward for the risks associated with its activities.' In the
complex, technical, and hazardous activities involved in oil and gas
operations, those risks are extensive and the losses involved may be
extraordinary. This is particularly troubling in light of the possibility that
the fact finder may misconstrue technical details and find negligence when,
in fact, none occurred. The prospect of liability for massive losses resulting
from difficult and inherently hazardous operations for which one is not
compensated for the risk assumed would quickly discourage many industry
parties from serving as operator. Without the agreement of the nonoperators to bear their share of those losses, joint operations become
difficult, if not impossible, to organize.
Another reason for the exculpatory clause is a concern over
inducing the operator to take too much care and forego opportunities that
could have provided increased benefits to all parties. This concern arises
when a negligent party can be held liable for the entire loss without any
adjustment for the background risk that existed despite the level of care

170. See AAPL Form 610-1982, Art. V.B (on file with author).
171. The prudence of the limitation has been recognized by at least one court. See Archer
v. Grynberg, 738 F. Supp. 449,452 (D. Utah 1990).
172. See suWra note 86.
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taken by the injurer. The injurer winds up paying for the entire loss rather
than for the value of the increased risk of harm caused by its negligence."
The risk that the operator will be held liable for damages exceeding the
harm created by its negligence can cause the operator to be too cautious in
its handling of operations and in its assessment of additional action needed
to achieve maximum production from each well.
The exculpatory clause is further justified by the sharing
arrangement structured into the operating agreement. The good and
workmanlike standard, though limited by the exculpatory clause, is not the
only protection provided to the non-operators. All participants in a well are
responsible for their proportionate share of costs and are entitled to their
proportionate share of benefits. In most instances, the operator has as much
to gain or lose as any other participant. 4 As a result, the operator and nonoperator usually have the same economic incentive to operate each well
with a reasonable degree of care."r The exculpatory clause only reinforces
this arrangement by generally assuring that the operator is not encumbered
with disproportionate liability in the event of an oversight.
Despite its focus on gross negligence, the exculpatory clause does
not prevent the creation of implied duties through the negligence standard
imposed by the covenant to perform in a good and workmanlike manner.
However, it does preclude operator liability unless the operator's action or
inaction was the equivalent of gross negligence.
This leads back to the original question of what standard of conduct
the operator is responsible for when the non-operator seeks to recover
monetary damages. When dealing with the first dimension of a negligence
standard, that involving the manner of performance, it is clear that gross
negligence becomes the test for liability and the standard of conduct in that
setting. However, with respect to the second dimension of the negligence
standard dealing with actions that must be undertaken by the operator, one
must look more closely at what is being required by the provisions on
operator responsibilities and liabilities. Properly combined, the provisions
and their underlying purposes point to a standard similar to the business

173. See Gergen supra note 14, at 1020-21.
174. See supra note 114.
175. This protection is reinforced by several provisions in the operating agreement Where
there is any opportunity for self-serving activity by the operator, requirements and restrictions
are often placed on the operator. For example, the operator can execute drilling contracts only
after competitive bids have been obtained. If it decides to use its own equipment and crews for
drilling operations, it can only charge a fee consistent with competition in the area. Similarly,

if the operator elects to sell production on behalf of a non-operator, the operating agreement
requires that the sale must be made at the highest possible price. Additionally, the operator's
discretion over operational expenditures in non-emergency situations is limited to projects
costing less than $10,000.00, unless approval is obtained from all participants.
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judgment rule when the issue is whether the operator should have
undertaken specific action.
The business judgment rule was designed to protect corporate
directors and officers from liability for business decisions. It is both a
substantive rule of law and a procedural rule. As a substantive rule, it
provides that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the directors
to hold them liable if they acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and
with an honest belief that the decision was in the best interests of the
company. 7' As a procedural rule, it requires a party challenging the
business decision to meet a high burden of proof."r The rule establishes a
presumption that the directors and officers have reached a proper decision,
provided there has been no self-dealing or abuse of discretion.
Three factors argue for construing the exculpatory clause of the
operating agreement to require the application of the business judgment
rule in liability issues among the parties to the instrument. The first is the
similarity between the justifications that lie beneath the business judgment
rule and the exculpatory provisions of the operating agreement. Several
justifications have been cited for the business judgment rule. Among these
are the removal of impediments that discourage service by directors and

176. See K Franklin Balotti & James J.Henks, Jr. Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48
BuS. LAW. 1337,1337 (1993). See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720-22 (DeL 1971); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625,64243 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
The American Law Institute states the rule in Section 4.01 of its Principles of Corporate
Governance:
(a) A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's
or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that
an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a
like position and under similar circumstances. This Subsection (a) is subject

to the provisions of Subsection (c)(the business judgment rule) where
applicable....

(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills
the duty under this Section if the director or officer:

(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to
the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under
the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests
of the corporation.
Note that by complying with the criteria in Subsection (c), the director or officer is exempt from

liability under Section 4.01. If the complaining party can show otherwise, the safe harbor of the
business judgment rule does not apply and the director or officer will be judged by the
standards in Subsection (a). PwrNcipLn OF CORORATE GOvrMNENCE § 4.01, comment d.

177. Jay P. Moran, Business judgment Rule or Relic?: Cede v. Technicolor and the Continuing
Metamorphosisof DirectorDuty of Care, 45 EMORY L.J. 339,353 (1996).
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officers," avoidance of requirements that create risk-averse attitudes in
business enterprises," and an ability to rely on the protective nature of
disinterested judgment."' Given these factors, courts have hesitated to
second guess disinterested business decisions that are reasonably informed
and rational.
These justifications are nearly identical to the reasons cited above
for including the exculpatory clause in the operating agreement."' Given
the similarity in goals, it would be logical to employ the same guidelines
used in other commercial contexts to judge the operator's actions.
The second factor supporting import of the business judgment rule
into the operating agreement is the reliance on the gross negligence
standard in both contexts. The operating agreement expressly states that
this is the basis for the operator's liability to the non-operator. The business
judgment rule has been interpreted to essentially establish the same
standard."s The third factor is previous adoption of the concept in oil and
gas law when the interests of the parties coincide. As noted earlier," the
business judgment rule has been applied in place of the prudent operator
standard even in the context of a relational contract like the oil and gas lease
under circumstances where the interests of the lessor and lessee coincide so
that protection is afforded by a legitimate sharing arrangement. Where the
operating agreement transaction is structured so that asharing arrangement
can be relied upon to provide disinterested judgment, there should be no
hesitation to apply the business judgment rule.
It does not matter whether the action in question involves the
installation of a new compressor on an existing well, the initiation of legal
action before a regulatory agency, or the sending of additional information
to non-operators to keep them apprised of operations. When the
exculpatory provisions are in effect because the operator is being sued for
liability to the non-operators, the propriety of the operator's decision to act
or not to act should be determined in the same way that such a decision
would be judged in a corporate setting. As long as the operator's decision

178. See LARRYSODERQUIST&A.SOMmiEJR.,CORPORAIONS:CASES, MATMIS, PROBLEMS
209 (3d ed. 1986).
179. See LARRY RmsmN&PETER LxTsoU, BUSINESSAssOCIAONS§ 9.03 at 456 (3d ed. 11%)
("If managers were broadly liable for 'unreasonable' transactions, they would tend to err on
the side of caution in making decisions because they could not diversify away the substantial
liability risk. Their shareholders would not favor this cautious approach because most hold
diversified portfolios and therefore prefer risk-neutral managers.").
180. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (DeL 1984).
181. See supratext accompanying notes 171 to 175.
182. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (DeL. 1984) ("our analysis satisfies us that
under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross
negligence").
183. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 54.
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was made in good faith with adequate information and with an honest
belief that the decision was in the best interests of the operator and nonoperators, the courts should refrain from substituting their business
judgment for that of the operator. This assures that the operator, if it is to
absorb the losses of the non-operators for an incorrect decision, will be
liable only if its decision making was grossly negligent. This is the only
outcome that structures the operating agreement so that the extraordinary
risks of petroleum operations are shared by the participants and negative
incentives for serving and acting as operator are eliminated.
CONCLUSION
The prudent operator standard has served a useful purpose in the
oil and gas lease. Through its implied covenants, the standard has supplied
terms that the parties are unable to negotiate prior to actual operations on
the property. In doing so, it has filled gaps in the parties' agreement and
controlled the broad discretionary powers granted the lessee by the express
terms of the lease.
The prudent operator standard gives the courts extraordinary
latitude in fashioning a fair result in a dispute over lessee performance. The
flexibility the concept offers, together with the widespread acceptance given
the standard by the industry, makes it a tempting device for resolving
contractual disputes in other industry transactions. As a result, there have
been efforts to incorporate the prudent operator standard into the joint
operating agreement by equating the standard with the express
requirement that the operator conduct operations in a good and
workmanlike manner.
The latter concept, like the prudent operator concept, is based on
a negligence standard. Although the two concepts are equated by
definition, it cannot be assumed that the good and workmanlike standard
functions the same way in the operating agreement as the prudent operator
standard does in the oil and gas lease. In particular, one cannot assume that
the covenant to perform operations in a good and workmanlike manner
implies that the operator will undertake all actions that seem reasonable
under the circumstances. This conclusion can be reached only after proper
construction of the instrument in its entirety.
For covenants to be implied in the operating agreement as under
the prudent operator standard, the instrument must either qualify as a
relational contract or allow the addition of duties under the classical rules
of contract construction. Even then, the application of the implied covenant
may be restricted by the exculpatory clause that is attached to the
performance standard in the operating agreement. Thus far, courts applying
the prudent operating standard to create implied duties in the operating
agreement have failed to consider these factors.
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Unlike the oil and gas lease, the operating agreement cannot be
easily treated as a relational contract. Although it falls somewhere along a
continuum between the relational contract and the traditional contingent
contract, it more closely resembles the contingent contract. The operator
does not enjoy the range of discretion given to the lessee. Limits are placed
on the operator by restricting its authority to drilling and maintaining
specific wells approved by the parties and through detailed provisions on
a wide variety of administrative issues. Even within the range of discretion
given to the operator, the possibility of opportunistic behavior is greatly
reduced by the sharing arrangement that is structured into the transaction
and effective for most operations. Moreover, several factors indicate that the
parties intended a thorough allocation of risks in their contract. As a
consequence, the operating agteement is not the type of contract where,
according to relational contract theory, implied provisions can be supplied
without following traditional rules of construction.
Because the operating agreement is not a relational contract, the
traditional rules of contract construction must be used in determining
whether implied duties exist. Under these rules, care must be used to assure
that the subject matter of an implied duty does not extend the operator's
functions beyond the parameters of the agreement, that the subject has not
already been addressed in express terms of the instrument, and that the
new obligation is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the transaction. There
may well be terms that must be implied under these criteria, even in the
operating agreement. However, given the tightly circumscribed
responsibilities delegated to the operator, the existing provisions on notices
and information, and the practical problems inherent in requiring the
operator to determine the precise moment of cessation of production, it
seems highly inappropriate to imply a duty to provide notice of the
shutdown of a well, as permitted by the Norman decision.
Finally, any assertion that the operator is liable for failing to
perform its duties under the operating agreement must take the
instrument's exculpatory clause into account. In most contemporary
operating agreements, the parties stipulate that the operator is not liable for
losses suffered by the non-operators unless the loss has been caused by the
operators' gross negligence or willful misconduct. Even if an implied
covenant were found to exist under proper interpretive criteria, the
operator would not be liable for the simple breach or for negligent
performance of that covenant.
There are substantial reasons for protecting the operator in this
fashion. These not only justify the use of the exculpatory clause but also
suggest that a standard of liability similar to the business judgment rule
should be applied whenever there is a question of whether the operator
should have undertaken actions that are not expressly required by the
operating agreement. This approach has worked well in the context of
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corporate business decisions and is fully consistent with the gross
negligence standard, the sharing arrangement that is normally in effect in
the operating agreement, and the underlying reasons for including the
exculpatory clause in the operating agreement.
The judicial decisions that have sought to imply covenants in the
operating agreement by the same process used in the oil and gas lease have
failed to consider the foregoing factors. In failing to do so, they have
misconstrued the nature of the operating agreement, misapplied the rules
of construction traditionally applied to contingent contracts, and ignored
express provisions in the parties' agreement. Instead of implementing the
instrument as intended by the parties, the result threatens to alter the
structure- of the operating agreement by expanding the duties of the
operator far beyond what can be tolerated by the transaction.
The operating agreement is a detailed and carefully crafted
instrument designed to accomplish a limited set of goals. The nature of the
instrument, the terms of the agreement, and the intent of the parties must
be carefully considered before a court tampers with the balance of risks
between the parties. Hopefully, future assertions about implied duties will
be more thoroughly considered by the courts.

